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Abstract. Four principal features of autonomous control systems are left both 
unaddressed and unaddressable by present-day engineering methodologies: 1. The 
ability to operate effectively in environments that are only partially known beforehand 
at design time; 2. A level of generality that allows a system to re-assess and re-define 
the fulfillment of its mission in light of unexpected constraints or other unforeseen 
changes in the environment; 3. The ability to operate effectively in environments of 
significant complexity; and 4. The ability to degrade gracefully – how it can continue 
striving to achieve its main goals when resources become scarce, or in light of other 
expected or unexpected constraining factors that impede its progress. We describe 
new methodological and engineering principles for addressing these shortcomings, 
that we have used to design a machine that becomes increasingly better at behaving 
in underspecified circumstances, in a goal-directed way, on the job, by modeling itself 
and its environment as experience accumulates. Based on principles of autocatalysis, 
endogeny, and reflectivity, the work provides an architectural blueprint for constructing 
systems with high levels of operational autonomy in underspecified circumstances, 
starting from only a small amount of designer-specified code – a seed. Using a value-
driven dynamic priority scheduling to control the parallel execution of a vast number of 
lines of reasoning, the system accumulates increasingly useful models of its 
experience, resulting in recursive self-improvement that can be autonomously 
sustained after the machine leaves the lab, within the boundaries imposed by its 
designers. A prototype system has been implemented and demonstrated to learn a 
complex real-world task – real-time multimodal dialogue with humans – by on-line 
observation. Our work presents solutions to several challenges that must be solved 
for achieving artificial general intelligence. 
1 Introduction 
Engineering is essentially to couple a system, an environment and a mission to meet 
a predefined set of requirements (Sanz, Matia & Galán, 2000). Present-day control 
architectures solve this problem only under the following assumption: The 
environment is well defined and so are the ways to achieve its mission. Given an 
ability to impart to a machine sufficient knowledge and resources for operating in a 
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fully specified environment, systems can currently be built that meet task-related 
goals. What this approach doesn’t address at all is: (a) How to build a system that is 
flexible and general enough to adapt when the environment changes from its initial 
specification, and to redefine accordingly its ways to fulfill its mission; (b) How to 
make a system cope with an environment the complexity of which allows only partial 
descriptions (i.e. when specifications become intractable); and (c) Since any physical 
system is resource-bounded, how to enable such systems to continue operation and 
degrade gracefully when their resources become scarce, or when adaptation to any 
other changes becomes necessary. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Scope and complexity of input to learning machines 
Intelligence is a technical means to the end of controlling a system’s behavior so that 
it can survive adversity, be kept operating within its imposed and natural boundaries 
and still deliver the value it was intended to deliver. Our work concerns the creation of 
autonomous controllers that meet the unaddressed limitations of artificial intelligent 
systems, and this requires a re-evaluation of present engineering methodologies. 
First, to address the question of what a system can do after it leaves the lab, we must 
assume that the artificial general intelligent (AGI) systems of the future, to deserve the 
name, can learn complex tasks autonomously. Even tasks done routinely by 5-year 
olds, such as cleaning up the playroom, are beyond the capability of today's systems. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, current learning systems are limited to a handful of input and 
output parameters (Figure 1-A), typically on a single pre-defined task in a well-
defined, unchanging environment. Let tski (Figure 1-B) refer to relatively non-trivial 
tasks such as assembling furniture and moving books, computers, tables, and chairs 
from one office to another, state-of-the-art machine-learning technique L0 is limited to 
learn only about a small subset of the various things that must be learned to achieve 
such a task. Being able to handle such a task in full, L1 in Figure 1-B is already more 
capable than most if not all advanced learning AI available today, being able to learn a 
single such complex task whose features were unknown prior to the system's 
deployment, even if it can only do so in one situation (S1). L2, L3 and L4 take 
successive steps up the complexity ladder beyond that, being able to learn a number 
of complex tasks (L2), in other situations (L3), and in a wider range of environments 
and mission spaces (L4). Our work aims at toward the higher end of this ladder, at 
systems capable of learning to perform multiple a-priori unknown tasks, in multiple a-
priori unknown environments. 
Current engineering methodologies assume that code is written by humans. Yet to 
design systems that exhibit even modest levels of autonomy after they leave the lab, it 
is clear that we cannot continue on building the whole knowledge base of such 
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systems by hand: The demanding requirements of complex environments, of these 
future systems' missions, and of their task-execution and problem solving skills, are 
pushing the development effort out of the reach of what standard software and 
hardware engineering practices currently are capable of supporting. To build systems 
of greater complexity than current ones – which any system meeting the above 
unaddressed requirements unavoidably will be – the methodology must bring the 
complexity of system development to manageable levels. Ideally we would like a 
system to gradually implement and improve itself by learning its own task-solving 
methods using its architecture-provided resources by interacting with its environment, 
whenever necessary. To move towards systems with higher levels of operational 
autonomy and increased abilities for autonomous learning, these methodological and 
systemic shortcomings must be addressed. But if such capabilities are out of the 
scope of present software development approaches, how shall we approach the 
engineering of a system endowed with the aforementioned qualities? 
In Nivel and Thórisson (2009) we proposed a stringent definition of an autonomous 
system, as a system that is operationally and semantically closed. Operational closure 
characterizes a system whose internal agency is maintained – i.e. re-organized and 
possibly expanded – at runtime by means of its own operation. In the case of software 
systems, such behavior would mean that components are continually added and 
deleted as a side-effect of the system‘s normal execution: Some components are 
learned whereas some others are discounted as a result of their poor performance. 
From this perspective, such systems can be seen as autocatalytic sets
1
 whose 
components are implemented and maintained by the system itself. Semantic closure 
is a system's ability to control the reorganization of its agency with a purpose: 
Purposeful, goal-oriented self-organization. To achieve this, a system's architecture 
must be represented in a semantically transparent manner – making the system 
reflective – to endow the system with an ability to analyze and rewrite its own 
structure (Nivel & Thórisson 2009, Sanz & Lopez 2000). Autonomy means being free 
from interference from the outside, which in the case of artificial systems means the 
system's designers. A system that continuously learns and re-programs itself to adapt 
and get better must be equipped from the outset with a "seed", an initial and minimal 
set of instructions general enough to guide the system's bootstrapping its auto-
catalytic operation in any instance of its broad set of target environments and tasks. 
Such a system is endogenous in the sense that its behavior results solely from its 
internal operation and goals and cannot be controlled directly by any external 
operator, but rather can only take indirect instruction, which it must evaluate in light of 
its own current knowledge, like a human would. 
The freedom of action entailed by high levels of autonomy is however balanced by 
hard constraints. First, an autonomous system, to be of any value, is functionally 
bounded by its mission, which imposes not only the requirements the system has to 
meet, but also the constraints it has to respect. Second, to keep the system operating 
within its functional boundaries, one has to ensure that some parts of the system will 
never be rewritten autonomously – for example, the management of motivations shall 
be excluded from rewriting as this would possibly allow the transgression of the 
constraints imposed by the designers. In that sense, the system is also bounded, 
operationally, by its own architecture. Last, any implemented system is naturally 
bounded by the resources (CPU, time, memory, inputs) and knowledge at its disposal. 
For these reasons, autonomy, as we refer to it, shall therefore be understood as 
bounded autonomy. 
Our work described here presents evidence and arguments in support of the 
                                                 
1 An autocatalytic set is a collection of entities, each of which can be created catalytically by 
other entities within the set, such that as a whole, the set is able to catalyze its own 
production. In this way the set as a whole is said to be autocatalytic. 
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conclusion that the path towards building artificial general intelligence (AGI) systems 
can be made possible by meeting – at a minimum – these three requirements of auto-
catalysis, endogeny, and reflectivity (AER). These must be implemented in a unified 
whole, for it is the transversal application of these principles
2
 in an architecture that 
bring their value to the system (Thórisson & Nivel 2009). Unfortunately, none of the 
methodologies available in the AI or CS literature are directly applicable for designing 
systems of this nature. For this reason we have advocated what we call a 
constructivist AI methodology (CAIM; Thórisson forthcoming, 2012, 2009, Nivel & 
Thórisson 2009, Thórisson & Nivel 2009), centered on continuous adaptation – 
learning that is "always on" and inherent in the system's core operation, and the 
growth of the system from a small seed. In the main, our constructivist approach has 
two key objectives: (a) based on the principles of AER, to achieve bounded recursive 
self-improvement and generality and, (b) to uncover the principles for – and to actually 
build – systems that, given a small set of seed information, manage the bulk of the 
bootstrapping work on their own, in environments and on tasks that may be new and 
unfamiliar. 
In this paper we present a control architecture blueprint – called Autocatalytic 
Endogenous Reflective Architecture (AERA) – that aspires to enable the engineering 
of AGI systems. First we describe the assumptions and functional requirements that 
provided the ground for the design of the architecture. Then in section 3 we describe 
the principles which guided the design of AERA. Section 4 presents the fundamental 
principles that govern the execution of AERA-based systems. We provide in section 5 
a detailed description of the architecture, both functionally and structurally, and 
explain how the aforementioned principles are brought to bear to yield higher-order 
cognitive functions. AERA has been implemented and used for building a prototype 
the evaluation of which is given in section 6. In section 7, we discuss our approach in 
light of related work. Finally, in section 8, we sketch out our plans for future 
developments. 
2 Assumptions & Requirements 
Our objective is to design control architectures for autonomous systems meant 
ultimately to control machinery (like for example robots, power grids, cars, plants, 
etc.). All physical systems have limited resources, and the ones we intend to build are 
no exception: they have limited computing power, limited memory, and limited time to 
fulfill their mission. All physical systems also have limited knowledge about their 
environment and the tasks they have to perform for accomplishing their mission. Wang 
(2011) merged these two assumptions into one, called AIKR – the assumption of 
insufficient knowledge and resources – which then forms the basis of his working 
definition of intelligence: “To adapt with insufficient knowledge and limited resources”. 
We have adopted this definition as one of the anchors of our work, being much in line 
with Simon’s concept of “bounded rationality” (Simon 1957). This perspective means 
that we cannot expect any optimal behaviors from our systems since their behaviors 
will always be constrained by the amount and reliability of knowledge they can 
accumulate at any particular point in time. In other words we can only expect from 
these systems their displaying of a best effort strategy. 
No system can be built (or build itself) completely from scratch and we assume that a 
system is given some initial “innate” knowledge that allows interacting with the world – 
even if in a minimalistic way at first – to acquire more knowledge and improve its 
performance. Note that we do not consider any assumptions or requirements that 
pertain specifically to the biological reign. Our work is thus not "biologically inspired" in 
                                                 
2
 The principles are applied system-wide, that is, at every level of detail, to all the processes 
that ultimately realize the system’s operation. 
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any interesting or important sense of that term, and it is not our aim to mimic in some 
way the human mind or biological systems. 
We assume that the domain our system operates in is rich, dynamic and open-ended. 
This means that the domain cannot be fully described in advance, due to its inherent 
complexity and because it changes continuously, possibly entering states never 
observed before and for these reasons unbeknown to the system and its designers. 
That being said, we still assume that the domain presents some regularities of course: 
The environment is not random and is governed by laws that maintain it in a relative 
state of stability, at least for long enough to allow the system observing recurrences of 
states and transitions thereof. However, such regularities can be expected to happen 
at different time scales, and they are mixed with processes that for all practical 
purposes can be assumed to be stochastic. The domain is at all times only partially 
observable: Not all possible states are observable in a given environment at any given 
moment. 
Another assumption is that the kinds of systems we target are not expected to be 
general problem solvers in the sense of prior aspirations to this end in the world of AI
 
(Newell 1959) and are allowed to rely on ad-hoc specific I/O devices. These devices 
can be for example, servo-motors, speech recognition, machine vision or inverse 
kinematics sub-systems, etc. In general, we will consider an I/O device any sub-
system for which both its mission and environment (i.e. a sub-set of the global 
environment the main system operates in) can be well-defined – the rationale being 
that in these cases ad-hoc optimized solutions are always more efficient than general 
ones. We do not impose any specific way for integrating the devices into the 
architecture but the integration should offer various degrees of flexibility. For example, 
devices can implement full solutions or partial solutions (think for example of many 
shape recognition sub-systems, federated by the architecture itself; one can also 
imagine a set of redundant sub-systems with various degrees of performance and 
reliability). The I/O devices can be considered part of the environment a system has to 
control and as such the system must be able to model these devices – for example to 
predict or recognize sensor or actuator failures. This implies that such I/O devices 
must send to the main system reports of their operation – for example an actuator 
receiving a command from the system shall answer with the command that was 
actually applied (the desired and actual commands being not always necessarily the 
same). 
The assumptions listed so far form the background for the functional requirements we 
established for our architecture – which are: 
R1. The system must fulfill its mission – the goals and constraints it has 
been given by its designers – with possibly several different priorities.  
Flexibility with respect to top-level goals and constraints is needed if we want the 
system to be able to focus on the most important tasks at hand, and discard or 
postpone the achievement of the rest of its primary objectives, when facing scarcity of 
resources. This also applies to lower-level goals /sub-goals, i.e. goals generated by 
the system itself to achieve the top-level goals. 
R2. The system must be designed to be operational in the long-term, 
without intervention of its designers after it leaves the lab, as dictated by 
the temporal scope of its mission.  
This means that a system should be as autonomous as possible, to remain 
operational for extended periods of time without re-adjustment, re-programming, or re-
definition from its designers, thus being equipped to face changes in its environment 
and adapt to these on its own. 
R3. The system must be domain- and task-independent – but without a 
strict requirement for determinism: We limit our architecture to handle 
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only missions for which rigorous determinism is not a requirement. 
The requirement of generality also implies that a system must handle inputs coming 
concurrently from various arbitrary sources and modalities, in other words, no domain-
dependent knowledge representation schemes can be tolerated. The systems we 
envision are essentially non-deterministic in the sense that their behavior depends on 
the accumulated experience: Given a situation and a set of goals, the machine is likely 
to perform differently in a new occurrence of said situation from what it did in the past 
because it may have learned new ways to operate by having captured new knowledge 
between the two instances of the same situation. 
R4. The system must be able to model its environment to adapt to 
changes thereof.  
This means in practice that the system must be able to learn new skills, possibly for 
new environments, augmenting its skill repertoire. The system also has to re-learn 
some skills it has already acquired in case these are not adapted to the environment 
anymore. Since changes in the environment are not always predictable, the system 
must be able to learn continually, incrementally and in real-time. The system does not 
only have to adapt its behavior but also has to adapt the way it generates it according 
to the resources at hand. In other terms, the system must be able to adapt its 
computation to the scarcity of its resources and degrade gracefully accordingly. 
R5. As with learning, planning must be performed continuously, 
incrementally and in real-time. Pursuing goals and predicting must be 
done concurrently.  
In particular, the system must anticipate the environment for acting – a controller that 
does not anticipate its environment is poised to react after the facts, i.e. to lag behind 
its target. The rationale for concurrent goal pursuit and anticipation is that (a) since 
achieving goals needs predictions, the latter shall be up to date and thus a system 
cannot stop predicting because it is planning its next move and, (b) the system will not 
have the luxury to predict any possible state transition in its environment; the only 
interesting ones are those that pertain to the achievements of its goals, therefore 
these goals must be up to date when predictions are generated. 
R6. The system must be able to control the focus of its attention.  
As already mentioned, the system has limited resources and the environment a high 
level of complexity. A system thus has to dedicate its computing power to only address 
the stimuli that are most relevant to its goals and discard the rest. For a discussion 
about the fundamental impact of attention on the control of autonomous systems, see 
Helgason (2013), Helgason & Thórisson (2012), and Helgason et al. (2013). 
From R4, R5 and R6 we can require that the three major high-level cognitive functions 
- learning, attentional control and planning – must be concurrent.  
The system must be able to learn from events whenever they happen, regardless of 
its other activities; in a similar way, the system cannot wait for learning to terminate 
before acting, and attention must always and continually be directed appropriately so 
as to avoid wasting computing power and time, for example by learning irrelevant 
state transitions and planning according to irrelevant inputs and predictions. 
R7. The system must be able to model itself.  
The system does not only have to model its environment for acting. It should also be 
able to model itself in the environment to be able to predict its own reactions and the 
success or failure thereof. Moreover a system also has to model itself for adapting its 
behaviors to the resources available – for example by changing the priorities of some 
of its goals and redirect its CPU and time budgets to the most urgent goals. Self-
modeling necessitates that part of the operation of the system is visible to the system 
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itself (we call this property operational reflectivity) as internal inputs (the external 
inputs being the stimuli received from the environment). 
R8. The system must be able to handle incompleteness, uncertainty, and 
inconsistency, both in state space and in time. 
Since the environment is only partially observable, and since the system has limited 
resources, said system can only expect to acquire an incomplete representation of the 
world, possibly including inconsistencies. Therefore its knowledge shall be defeasible 
and can only be established to a certain degree and within a certain period of time. 
R9. The system must be able to generate abstractions from learned 
knowledge.  
Abstraction is a form of compression and therefore will contribute to maintain the 
system’s operation in its prescribed envelope by reducing the amount of knowledge 
required to solve some tasks and consequently by reducing the time it takes to 
process said knowledge. In that respect, the system must be able to learn 
mathematical functions (a form of abstraction) – for example to predict the next 
position of a moving object, given its current position and speed. In the work 
described here we restrict this requirement to linear functions and approximate more 
complex functions by the recursive application of linear ones on input data. 
3 Design Principles 
In light of our functional requirements outlined above we have established five key 
principles to guide the design of our architecture. 
Uniform fine-grained executable knowledge. Knowledge is composed of states (be 
they past, present, predicted, desired or hypothetical) and of executable code (called 
models). Models are capable of generating such knowledge (for example, generating 
predictions, hypotheses or goals) and are executed by a virtual machine (in the case 
of AERA, its executive). 
The granularity of such models shall be kept low for two main reasons. First, it is 
easier to add and replace small (low-grained) models than larger ones because the 
impact of their addition or replacement in the architecture will be less than 
replacement of large models. In other words, low model granularity is aimed at 
preserving system plasticity, supporting the capability of implementing small, 
incremental changes in the system. Second, low granularity helps compositionality 
and reuse; small models can only implement limited low-level functions and, if 
abstract enough, are more likely to be useful for implementing several higher-level 
functions than coarser models that implement one or more such high-level functions 
in one big atomic block. We have referred to this elsewhere as the principle of pee-
wee granularity (Thórisson 2012, Nivel & Thórisson 2009, Thórisson & Nivel 2009). 
We also need the knowledge to be uniform, that is, encoded using one single scheme 
regardless of the particular data semantics. This helps to allow execution, planning, 
and learning algorithms to be both general and commensurate in resource usage 
(described in more detail below). 
The system must be capable of handling vast amounts of knowledge. The system is 
meant to operate in complex environments where it will be stimulated by a high 
number of inputs, thus increasing its need to understand them – that is, to produce a 
large amount of model candidates to predict these inputs. The system is to face 
novelty and to do so with limited prior knowledge. This means that it is not expected of 
the system that it is always able to identify relevant inputs; irrelevant or incorrect 
models shall be expected and the system shall be able to handle these. It follows that 
such a system has to implement a mechanism to trim down the irrelevant or faulty 
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models, calling for a continuous process of evaluating and revising vast amounts of its 
acquired but possibly uncertain knowledge. 
Massive fine-grained parallelism. As we cannot assume guarantees for system 
down-time (after all, we are targeting high levels of operational autonomy), all 
activities of the system, from low-level (for example, prediction, sub-goaling) to high-
level (like learning and planning), must be performed in real-time, concurrently, and 
continuously. Moreover, we need these activities to be executed in a way that is 
flexible enough to allow the system to dynamically (re-)allocate its resources 
depending on the urgency of the situation it faces at any point in time (with regards to 
its own goals and constraints), based on the availability of these same resources, 
over which it may not have complete (or any) control. The approach we chose is to 
break all activities down into fine-grained elementary reasoning processes that are 
commensurable both in terms of execution time and scheduling. These reasoning 
processes are the execution of various kinds of inference programs (models being 
one), and they represent the bulk of the computing. These programs are expected to 
be numerous and this calls for an architecture capable of handling massive amounts 
of parallel tasks (thereafter referred to as reasoning jobs, or jobs for short). 
Experience-based looped-back adaptation and cognitive control. Working under 
an assumption of incomplete knowledge and insufficient resources means that the 
systems we envision are neither likely to have the time and knowledge necessary to 
accomplish all the jobs they ideally should, given their goals, nor to process every 
input available in the environment.  Standard real-time control systems are designed 
to be deterministic: Capabilities, jobs, and inputs are predetermined, and 
schedulability - the pre-established proof that all jobs will be scheduled for execution - 
is critical. In sharp contrast, our systems are not expected to be deterministic, as their 
operation is grounded in their experience. Such systems must be able to react at any 
time, thus possibly striving to delay or, even better, discard jobs depending on (a) the 
urgency of the jobs with respect to current or predicted situations, (b) the estimated 
value
3
 of the jobs for the system as a whole and, (c) the resources available. These 
estimates (predictions, individual job value and value for the system) are derived from 
experience accumulated from past operation. From the operational level perspective, 
a system, as we see it, will never repeat any known algorithm to process a given set 
of inputs as algorithms are implemented by learned models. Due to its continuous 
learning, the system is essentially always re-computing the way anything should be 
done, on the fly, thus constantly modifying its "algorithms", even when repeating the 
same task many times sequentially. From a higher (functional) level perspective 
however, the system is still expected to behave as deterministically as possible, i.e. to 
achieve its goals under its prescribed constraints consistently and reliably, adapting to 
the change of conditions by accumulating experience that will predictably yield more 
value in the future. 
A cornerstone of our approach is that cognitive control results from the continual 
value-driven scheduling of reasoning jobs. According to this view, high-level cognitive 
processes are grounded directly in the core operation of the machine resulting from 
two complementary control schemes. The first is top-down: Scheduling allocates 
resources by estimating the global value of the jobs at hand, and this judgment results 
directly from the products of cognition – goals and predictions. These are relevant and 
accurate to various extents, depending on the quality of the knowledge accumulated 
so far. As the latter improves over time, goals and predictions become more relevant 
                                                 
3
 "Value“ is an assessment of "utility“, which refers to the learned, predicted achievability 
of all the goals the system pursues, which is ultimately sanctioned by, and grounded in, the 
environment. It is not the eponym concept, as widely used in the "machine learning" literature, 
which refers to some intrinsic, axiomatic, hard-coded heuristics. See 
section 4.3 Equation 6, for an unambiguous definition of the concept in the context of our 
work. 
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and accurate, thus allowing the system to allocate its resources with a better 
judgment; the most important goals and the most useful/accurate predictions are 
considered first, the rest being saved for later processing or even discarded, thus 
saving resources. In that sense, cognition controls resource allocation. The second 
control scheme is bottom-up: Resource allocation controls cognition. Shall resources 
become scarce (which is pretty much always the case in our targeted system-
environment-mission triples), scheduling narrows down the system’s attention to the 
most important goals/predictions the system can handle, trading scope for efficiency 
and therefore survivability – the system will only pay attention to the most promising 
(value-wise) inputs and inference possibilities. Reciprocally, shall the resources 
become more abundant, the system will start considering goals and predictions that 
are of less immediate value, thus opening up possibilities for learning and 
improvement. System’s resources are poised to continually oscillate between scarcity 
and abundance, as scarcity will push for more efficiency, which in turn releases more 
resources that become available for more speculative reasoning jobs, which in turn 
consumes more resources. 
Operational reflectivity. A system must know what it is doing, when, and at what 
cost. Enforcing the production of explicit traces of the system's operation allows 
building models of said operation, which is needed for self-control (also called meta-
control). In that respect, the functional architecture we seek shall be applicable to 
itself, i.e. a meta-control system for the system shall be implementable the same way 
the system is implemented to control itself in a domain. This principle is a prerequisite 
for integrated cognitive control (Sanz & Hernandez 2012). 
 
Figure 2 – Integrated Cognitive Control 
Our approach assumes that the system is interfaced with its environment 
via I/O devices, dedicated, domain-dependent sensors/effectors. Due to 
the assumed high ratio of available environmental data to cognitive 
computing resources, the devices cover only parts of the whole 
environment at the desired granularity, ranging from coarse-grain (like 
blob detection from visual data supplied via cameras) to fine-grain (e.g. 
edge detectors). 
The system consists of two essential parts: A memory (white disc) and an 
executive. The latter executes knowledge in the form of models, based 
on sensory inputs and the content of the memory (experience). 
The executive exposes several parameters and functions that can be 
viewed as internal effectors and traces of the system's own execution are 
continuously injected into its memory, in the form of internal inputs. These 
are processed in exactly the manner as sensory inputs. The processing 
of internal inputs and of the internal effectors allows – optionally - using 
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RUTR-SCS13006        11/56 
an instance of AERA (on the right of the picture) to control another one 
(on the left), realizing integrated cognitive control (ICC). 
Pervasive flexible representation of time. Representing time at several temporal 
scales, from the smallest levels of individual operations (e.g. producing a prediction) 
to a collective operation (e.g. achieving a mission) is an essential requirement for a 
system that must (a) perform in the real world and (b) model its own operation with 
regards to its expenditure of resources (as these include time). Considering time 
values as intervals allows encoding the variable precisions and accuracies needed to 
deal with the real world, for example, sensors do not always perform at fixed frame 
rates and so modeling their operation may be critical to ensure reliable operation of 
their controllers and models that depend on their input. Also, the precision for goals 
and predictions may vary considerably depending on both their time horizons and 
semantics. Last, since acquired knowledge can never be certain, one can assume 
that "truth" – asserting that a particular fact holds – can only be established for some 
limited time, and for varying degrees of temporal uncertainty. 
In conclusion, these design principles can be unified under the higher-level principle 
of “holistic design”. According to this principle, robustness shall be seen as the 
robustness of an entire situated system as a whole, for example, allowing a whole 
system to carry on most of its relevant operations while facing environmental 
adversity without breaking down because one of its sub-parts failed. In our view there 
are no sub-parts, but a dynamic pool of low-level generic processes that altogether 
implement the necessary functions for achieving a mission. The core idea is (a) to 
even out the load imposed by said sub-processes among the available resources and 
competencies and, (b) to fail gracefully when one or more processes fail or fail to be 
executed due to lack of resources. 
In our approach there are no sub-components called “learning” or “planner” and so 
on. Instead, learning and planning are emergent processes that result from the same 
set of low-level processes: These are essentially the execution of fine-grained 
programs and are thus reusable and shared system-wide, collectively implementing 
functions that span across the entire scope of the system’s operation in its 
environment. For example, models generate both goals and predictions, some other 
programs monitor their success or failure and are thus able to reinforce the system’s 
confidence about their effectiveness. Now, if we picture a skill as a plan, that is a 
succession of goals, then we see that such a skill is actually implemented by a set of 
models. From this perspective, learning a skill results from learning models and their 
sequence of execution, and this results from both the assessment of the performance 
of said models and the detection of novelty, which in turn produces new models. Both 
of these activities are examples of the aforementioned generic low-level processes. 
High-level processes (like planning and learning) influence each other: For example, 
learning better models and sequences thereof improves planning; reciprocally, having 
good plans also means that a system will direct its attention to more (goal-)relevant 
states, and this means in turn that learning is more likely to be focused on changes 
that impact the system’s mission, possibly increasing its chances of success. These 
high-level processes are dynamically coupled, as they both result from the execution 
of the same knowledge – the core of the system, its models. 
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Figure 3 – Holistic design 
In addition to observed states, assumptions, goals and predictions, the 
system’s memory contains executable code (in the form of models and 
other programs) and as such, constitutes an active part of the system: It 
is actually the very core of a model-based and model-driven system. The 
memory is responsible for most of the computation occurring in the 
system. Three main cognitive processes – attention, learning and 
planning – are themselves implemented by programs constituting the 
adaptable part of the system, the fixed part being the executive. These 
processes are indirectly and dynamically coupled through the memory as 
models are added, deleted, activated or phased-out, as dictated by the 
context and the goals pursued by the system.  
4 Principles of Operation 
We propose four main operational principles for an architecture intended to meet the 
functional requirements listed in section 2:  (a) A way to represent uncertain, 
defeasible, time-dependent knowledge, (b) a control hierarchy constituted of 
executable knowledge, either given or learned, (c) a way to deliver real-time 
performance, anytime, based on the value of computation expenses for the predicted 
welfare of the system as a whole and, (d) a way to abstract knowledge to contribute to 
the maintenance of computation demands within a limited resource budget. These 
form the content of the four sub-sections in this section. In the last sub-section, on 
abstraction, we give a concrete example of operation that pulls together many of the 
key principles listed here. 
4.1 Knowledge Representation 
Our approach to knowledge representation has its roots in a non-axiomatic term logic. 
This logic is non-axiomatic in the sense that knowledge is established on the basis of 
a system’s experience, that is, truth is not absolute but rather established to a certain 
degree and within a certain time interval. In our approach the simplest term thus 
encodes an observation, and is called a fact (or a counter-fact indicating the absence 
of an observation). A fact carries a payload - the observed event -, a likelihood value 
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in [0, 1] indicating the degree to which the fact has been ascertained and a time 
interval in microseconds – the period within which the fact is believed to hold (or, in 
the case of a counter-fact, the period during which the payload has not been 
observed). Facts have a limited life span, corresponding to the upper bound of their 
time interval. Payloads are terms of various types, some of which are built in the 
executive, the most important of these being atomic state, composite state, prediction, 
goal, command, model, success/failure, and performance measurement. Additionally, 
any type can be defined by the programmer, and new types can be created by I/O 
devices at runtime. We will look at each of these in turn: 
Atomic state. An atomic state encodes a simple relation between objects of the form 
“entity property value” (for example “entity_12 has_color_component_blue 128”, 
where “has_color_component_blue” is a domain-dependent user-defined term). A 
counter-evidence of this state could be for example “entity_12 
has_color_component_blue 96”, both evidences and counter-evidences are expected 
and AERA has been designed to handle such inconsistencies by allocating its 
resources based on the priorities of their respective processing (see section 4.3). 
Composite state and instantiated composite state. A composite state is a 
compound of abstract facts. Abstract facts are facts where some of their values have 
been replaced by variables. A composite state is therefore best viewed as a pattern of 
the conjunction of several facts. To take an example, a composite state coded as the 
conjunction of the facts “E has_color C”, “E bears_number N”, “E bears L” and “N 
bears_number L” can describe a bus, with a color, its bus line number and a license 
plate. When the executive observes an instance of the conjunction of facts specified 
by a composite state it produces an instance of said state (for instance, “yellow 
thing1, bearing both line number 19 and thing2 bearing number PDH2O”), as the 
payload of a new fact. This fact’s likelihood is the least likelihood found among its 
components and its time interval is the intersection of the components’ respective time 
intervals. 
Prediction. A prediction denotes a hypothetical future state and is encoded as a fact 
holding a payload (also a fact, the future state). The time interval associated with the 
predicted future state describes the interval within which the predicted state is 
expected to hold. 
Goal. Like a prediction, a goal is a fact holding a payload fact referencing the desired 
state. The time interval associated with the desired state describes the interval within 
which the state is to be achieved. 
Command. A command is an operation which, when embedded in a goal, is to be 
executed by an I/O device. Issuing a command to a device triggers an answer from 
said device in the form of the command that has actually been executed, which is 
dependent on the current capabilities of the device (the answer will be less than the 
command when the latter exceeds the capabilities of the hardware, as expected) – 
this answer is thereafter called an efferent copy and is encoded as the payload of a 
fact, i.e. as a regular input. 
Model and instantiated model. A model encodes procedural knowledge in the form 
of a causal relationship between two terms. A model is built from two patterns, left-
hand and right-hand. When an instance of the left-hand pattern is observed, then a 
prediction patterned after the right-hand pattern is produced, and reciprocally, when 
an instance of the right-hand pattern is observed (such an instance being a goal), 
then a sub-goal patterned after the left-hand pattern is produced. Each time a model 
predicts, the executive produces a new term, called an instantiated model that 
references the input, the output and the model itself. An instantiated model is thus a 
trace of the execution of a model and, being the payload of a fact, constitutes an 
(internal) input for the system. Models form the very core of an AERA system and their 
operation is detailed in the next sub-section. 
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Success/failure. The assessment of the success or failure of a goal or a prediction 
(and therefore of the models which produced them) constitutes an (internal) input of 
the system. These are encoded as fact payloads. 
Performance measurement. The system periodically assesses its processing 
performance in terms of the observed lag with regards to meeting its timely targets; 
for example, achieving goals in time, assessing the performance of its models, 
assessing the travel time of its jobs in the scheduler (see section 5.3). Such 
measurements are also internal inputs to the system. As for anything else, 
performance measurements are encoded as fact payloads. 
The life cycles of models and composite states are more complex than those of facts. 
Essentially their life span and capacity to operate are governed by the entire 
architecture, based on their individual performance. Models are said to be reliable 
when they predict correctly and consistently so; reliable models tend to be executed 
more often than unreliable models, the latter being eventually discarded when their 
performance becomes unacceptable (see section 5.2 for details). In addition, a 
garbage collector deletes models and composite states that have been the least 
recently used. 
4.2 Control Hierarchy 
AERA is data-driven, meaning that the execution of code is triggered by matching 
patterns with inputs. Code refers to models (which constitute executable knowledge), 
that have either been given (as part of the bootstrap code) or learned by the system. 
As mentioned above, models are structures composed of two terms – a left-hand term 
(LT) and a right-hand term (LR) – encoding a causal relationship between the two 
terms; an instance of LT entails the production of an instance of RT. Both of these 
terms are patterns, that is, terms containing variables. Models support two modes of 
execution. The first one, called forward chaining operates as follows: When an input 
term matches a LT, the executive produces an output, a prediction, patterned after the 
RT. In this mode, inputs can be facts holding any kind of payload, except goals. The 
other mode is called backward chaining: When an input goal matches a RT, an output 
is produced, a sub-goal, patterned after the LT. Additionally, when an input (other than 
a goal or a prediction) matches a RT, an assumption is produced, patterned after the 
LT. An assumption is a fact whose likelihood value is computed in a particular way 
(detailed in section 5.2.4). Notice that multiple instances of both forward and 
backward chaining can be executed concurrently by a given model – i.e. a model can 
produce several predictions from several different inputs while producing several 
goals and assumptions, from several other inputs at the same time. In addition to their 
two patterns LT and RT, models contain two sets of equations, called guards. These 
are equations meant to assign values to variables featured in the output, from the 
values held by variables in the input. One set of guards supports forward chaining, 
whereas the other one supports backward chaining. In our current implementation, 
guards are restricted to linear functions.  
The bootstrap code - the initial resource for the system - contains (among other 
things) drives and top-level models. A drive is an “innate” top-level goal given by the 
programmer, and whose semantics can also be of a constraint. A drive is essentially a 
goal whose payload is a fact that cannot be observed – think for example of the drive 
“keep operating successfully”: it is very unlikely that the environment will ever produce 
explicit evidences of such a state. That is where top-level models come into the 
picture: these help a fresh AERA-based system get started learning in a new domain. 
More specifically, a top-level model is hand-crafted for giving the system a way to 
entail the success (or failure) of a drive from an observable (such an observable could 
be “your owner gives you a reward”). As an AERA-based system is event-driven, 
drives and top-level models form together the system’s motivation, providing a top-
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down impetus for the system's running, while sensors provide an influx of data, driving 
its operation bottom-up. 
Depending on their respective patterns, models form control hierarchies based on 
pattern affordances: The output of one model can match a pattern of another and so 
on (see Figure 4). Such a hierarchy is traversed by two concurrent flows of 
information, bottom-up (inputs from the environment at the bottom, to the top-level 
models) and top-down (from the top-level models to commands). 
 
Figure 4 – Control based on pattern affordances 
A hierarchy of models is depicted. Models are built from two patterns, left-
hand and right-hand. These patterns are denoted using capital letters 
(their parameters and guards are omitted here for clarity). Top-level 
models are hand-crafted (as part of the bootstrap code), the vast majority 
of the rest of the models, which for a deployed system can run in the 
thousands, is learned. Motivated by drives (one is represented here as 
the black dot at the top), models produce sub-goals when super-goals 
match their right-hand pattern, and these sub-goals in turn match other 
models’ right-hand pattern until a sub-goal produces a command for 
execution by I/O devices. In parallel to this top-down flow of data, the 
hierarchy is traversed by a bottom-up data flow, originating from inputs 
sensed by the I/O devices that match the left-hand patterns of models, to 
produce predictions that in turn match other models’ left-hand patterns 
and produce more predictions. 
Whenever a model produces a prediction, the executive also produces a 
corresponding instantiated model: This is a term containing a reference to the model 
in question, a reference to the input that matched its LT and a reference to the 
resulting prediction. Such a reflection of operation constitutes a first-class input – i.e. 
an observable of the system’s own operation - which is, as any other input, eligible for 
abstraction (by replacing values with variables bound together by guards) thus 
yielding a pattern that can be embedded in a model. 
When a model M0 features such an instantiated model M1 as its LT then, in essence, 
M0 specifies a post-condition on the execution of M1, i.e. M0 predicts an outcome that 
is entailed by the execution of M1. In case the LT is a counter-evidence of a model’s 
execution (meaning that the model failed to execute because despite having matched 
an input, its pre-conditions were not met – pre-conditions are explained immediately 
here below), the post-condition is referred to as a negative post-condition, positive 
I/O devices 
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otherwise. Symmetrically, when a model features an instantiated model as its RT, it 
essentially specifies a pre-condition on the execution of the embedded model 
instance, i.e. when a condition is matched (LT), the model predicts the success or 
failure of the execution of a target model (the one an instance of which is the RT). 
More specifically, what a pre-condition means is “if the target model executes, it will 
succeed (or fail)”. In case the RT is a counter-evidence of a model’s successful 
execution (predicted failure), the pre-condition is referred to as a negative pre-
condition, positive otherwise. 
 
Figure 5 – Control with pre- and post-conditions 
Each time a model produces a prediction, the executive injects a trace of 
its execution called an instantiated model (noted iM0 for the model M0). 
The execution of the positive pre-condition M1 enables the execution of 
M0 whereas the execution of the negative pre-condition M2 inhibits it. 
The execution of M0 is an input matching the left-hand pattern of the post-
condition M3, thus triggering a prediction patterned after C, the right-hand 
pattern of M3. If M0 matches an instance of its left pattern A but its pre-
conditions are not met, then the executive produces an input |iM0, which 
means “failure to execute”. This input can match the left pattern of a 
model (here M4) and trigger some prediction (that would be patterned 
after D). 
Control with pre-conditions consists of ensuring that all negative pre-conditions and at 
least one positive one are satisfied before deciding to let the controlled model 
operate. This decision is made by comparing the greatest likelihood of the negative 
pre-conditions to the greatest likelihood of the positive ones. 
4.3 Scheduling 
A job in AERA is a request for processing one input by one program (for example, a 
model). All jobs (like for example, forward and backward chaining) are assigned a 
priority that governs the point(s) in time when they may be executed. Jobs are 
uninterruptible but might get delayed and even eventually discarded if they become 
irrelevant. Jobs’ priorities are continually updated, thus allowing high-value new jobs 
to get executed before less important jobs, and old jobs to become more valuable 
than newer ones as new evidences constantly accumulates. Thus a job priority 
depends on the utility value of the program and the expected value of the input (these 
values are explained below). Value-driven scheduling stands at the very heart of our 
design and underpins our aim of looped-back adaptation and cognition. 
Chaining jobs are some of the numerous jobs AERA can schedule; we will encounter 
more of these below. Our present concern is to describe the operation of a model 
hierarchy, which is best understood by looking at the scheduling of the chained jobs.  
Inputs are assigned a control value called urgency, defined as follows: 
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𝑇𝐻𝑍(𝑥, 𝑡) = {
𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒(𝑥) − 𝑡, 𝑡 < 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒(𝑥)
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
𝑈𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(𝑥, 𝑡) = 1 −
𝑇𝐻𝑍(𝑥, 𝑡)
Max
𝑖
(𝑇𝐻𝑍(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑡)) + 𝑈
 
Where 𝑇𝐻𝑍  stands for “time horizon” and where 𝑡  is the time of 
evaluation of the functions, 𝑥 an input, 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒(𝑥) the upper bound 
of 𝑥 ’s time interval and 𝑥𝑖  all the inputs in the system. 𝑈 (𝑈  > 0) is a 
parameter of the system meant to prevent the urgency of the input with 
the highest time horizon from being zero. 
Equation 1 
Inputs, in case their life time expires, are not deleted if they have been scheduled for 
processing and the corresponding job is still in the jobs list and has not been 
cancelled. A model is assigned a control value, its reliability, defined as the number of 
times the model predicted correctly (i.e. the positive evidences of its correct operation) 
divided by the total number of prediction attempts (total number of evidences) plus 
one: 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑚, 𝑡) =
𝑒+(𝑚, 𝑡)
𝑒(𝑚, 𝑡) + 1
 
Where 𝑚 is a model, 𝑒+(𝑚, 𝑡) the number of positive evidences for the 
operation of 𝑚 and 𝑒(𝑚, 𝑡) the total number of evidences, both evaluated 
at time 𝑡. The reliability is actually the product of the success rate of the 
model ( 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑚, 𝑡) =
𝑒+(𝑚,𝑡)
𝑒(𝑚,𝑡)
) and its experience 
(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑚, 𝑡) =
𝑒(𝑚,𝑡)
𝑒(𝑚,𝑡)+1
). 
Equation 2 
The likelihood of a goal (its likelihood to be reached) or of a prediction (its likelihood to 
come true) is defined as the product of the reliability of the models that were involved 
in the chaining having produced said goal or prediction: 
𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑(𝑥, 𝑡) = ∏ 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑚𝑖(𝑥), 𝑡)
𝑖
 
Where 𝑥 is a goal or a prediction, 𝑚𝑖(𝑥) are the models forming the chain 
that produced 𝑥 from an initial input (a drive if 𝑥 is a goal, a sensory or 
internal input if 𝑥 is a prediction); 𝑡 is the time at which the function is 
evaluated. The likelihood of a sensory/internal input is 1 whereas the one 
of a drive is defined by the programmer. 
Equation 3 
We define the expected value of an input (all kinds, except goals) as the product of its 
urgency and its likelihood: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒(𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝑈𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(𝑥, 𝑡) × 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑(𝑥, 𝑡) 
Where 𝑥 is an input and 𝑡 the time the function is evaluated. 
Equation 4 
The likelihood of a goal, as defined as above, helps the system qualify its experience 
as it combines the reliability of models, but another valuable source of information is 
conveyed by the predictions of reaching a desired state. The likelihood of a goal must 
therefore be redefined to combine both of these two sources of information, the 
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rationale being to lower the expected value of pursuing a goal if the system is 
predictably more likely to reach the desired state by other means than deriving sub-
goals from the goal in question: 
𝐿𝑒𝑡 𝑃(𝑥, 𝑡) = Max
𝑖
(𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑡)) 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑(𝑥, 𝑡)
= {
𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑(𝑥, 𝑡), 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑(𝑥, 𝑡) ≥ 𝑃(𝑥, 𝑡)
1 − 𝑃(𝑥, 𝑡), 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒(𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝑈𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(𝑥, 𝑡) × 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑(𝑥, 𝑡) 
Where 𝑥 is a goal, 𝑝𝑖 the predictions of 𝑥’s target state and 𝑡 the time the 
function is evaluated. 
Equation 5 
The priority of a forward chaining job (matching an input with the LT of a model) is the 
product of the expected value of the input and what we call the utility of a model - that 
is, the (normalized) maximum of the expected values of the goals the model has 
produced so far and that have still not been achieved. It is worth noting that the utility 
of a model accounts for the value of executing the model for the system as a whole, 
as it combines the expected values of all the goals currently pursued by the system: 
𝐿𝑒𝑡 𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑚, 𝑇, 𝑡) = Max
𝑖
(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒(𝑥𝑖(𝑇, 𝑚), 𝑡)) 
𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑚, 𝑇, 𝑡) =
𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑚, 𝑇, 𝑡)
Max
𝑖
(𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑚𝑖 , 𝑇, 𝑡))
 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑥, 𝑚, 𝑡)
= 𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑚, 𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑠, 𝑡) × 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒(𝑥, 𝑡) 
Where 𝑚 is a model, 𝑇 a class of outputs (either Predictions or Goals), 
𝑥𝑖(𝑇, 𝑚) the outputs in 𝑇 produced by 𝑚, 𝑚𝑖 the models in the system, 𝑥 
an input and 𝑡 the time the function is evaluated. 
Equation 6 
The priority of a backward chaining job is the product of the expected value of the 
incoming goal and the utility of the model, the latter being the (normalized) maximum 
expected value of the predictions produced so far by the model. As in the case of 
forward chaining, the utility of a model has here also a system-wide significance as it 
corresponds intuitively, in the present case of backward chaining, to the “focus” of a 
system on data that may fulfill its “desires” (i.e. drives and derived sub-goals); in other 
words the system’s attention is accounted for by the utility values of all the models in 
the system and the expected values of its current goals (see section 5.1): 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑥, 𝑚, 𝑡)
= 𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑚, 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠, 𝑡) × 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒(𝑥, 𝑡) 
Where the parameters and functions are defined as in Equation 6 above. 
Equation 7 
Conceptually, the scheduler’s operation can now be described as follows: It is a list of 
jobs and a set of worker threads (in the sense of operating system threads) which pick 
up the highest priority jobs for processing, as a result of which new jobs can possibly 
be inserted in the list. Job priorities are re-computed frequently, as they depend on 
time and on the current activity of the system (essentially, the assessment of the 
model performance, and the set of the current goals). It is worth noting that some jobs 
may get delayed repeatedly until their priority drops down to insignificant numbers (for 
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example when the urgency of a goal becomes zero, i.e. when its deadline has 
expired) and eventually get cancelled. This is likely to happen in situations where 
either the CPU power becomes scarce or the number of jobs exceeds the available 
computing power – which is the expected fate of any system limited in both 
knowledge and resources. 
Figure 6 – Scheduling 
The matching
4
 of one input and the input pattern of one program triggers 
the creation of a job which is inserted in the scheduling list. Worker 
threads extract the highest priority jobs and execute them. This results in 
the production of new inputs (goals, predictions, reflective inputs, etc.) 
and programs that fuel in turn the production of new jobs. Notice that 
priorities are dynamic – they depend both on time and on the ever-
changing utility values of all the programs in the entire system - and are 
thus recomputed frequently. 
Some jobs are not controlled by priorities but by time events instead (see 
section 5.2). The system maintains a separate list of such time-triggered 
jobs executed by a dedicated pool of threads (not represented here). 
In the main, job priorities depend on the past experience of the system (the models 
and their reliability), the urgency of the inputs and the current activity of the system (in 
the form of the models’ utility values). It follows that, all other values being equal, 
chaining jobs involving the best models will be scheduled first. Jobs involving inputs 
that are relevant to the system’s operation will also be scheduled first. This is to 
highlight the fact that the plasticity of computation is achieved by (a) fine-grained jobs 
and (b) the current activity of the system, which, by design is (c) constrained by 
(practically unavoidable) limitations on knowledge (number and reliability of the 
models) and resources (time, memory and available inputs). 
In addition to the aforementioned prioritization strategy, we use two ancillary control 
mechanisms. These come in the form of two thresholds, one on the likelihood of 
terms, the other on the reliability of models. When a term’s likelihood gets under the 
first threshold, it becomes ineligible as a possible input for pattern matching; 
reciprocally, when the reliability of a model gets under the second threshold, it cannot 
process any input – it is deactivated until said second threshold is increased. These 
thresholds are a filtering mechanism that operates before priorities are computed (the 
precise operation of these is beyond the scope of the present paper). The executive 
exposes functions to modify these thresholds as internal commands that can be 
executed by models, like any other command on effectors in the environment. 
                                                 
4
 Matching is attempted by the executive immediately upon the generation of either a program 
or an input. 
          
… 
 
  
  
  
  
input 
program job  
thread 
increasing priorities 
new 
input 
new 
program 
RUTR-SCS13006        20/56 
4.4 Abstraction 
Models are fully abstracted since their patterns contain only variables. This means for 
example, that any particular input data matching a model’s LT will trigger a prediction. 
A model may thus produce correct predictions for a subset of the matching inputs, and 
produce incorrect predictions for the rest of these inputs. Now, as we briefly 
mentioned in section 4.1 above, models are discarded when their predictions become 
too unreliable. This indicates that over-fitting the inputs can be dangerous for a model: 
A model that predicts correctly in some cases can still be discarded because it 
predicts incorrectly in some other cases. 
To avoid over-fitting, the scope of models is restricted on a case-by-case basis, 
meaning that the history of relevant inputs is used to determine whether a model can 
be executed or not. Relevant inputs are the inputs that have been processed by a 
model (using forward chaining) and identified as having led to the success or the 
failure of said model. Case-based control is encoded using models, the only 
difference with the models as described so far being that they are partially 
instantiated: Their LT can contain values taken from the historical inputs that have 
been used to build them. Such partially instantiated models constitute historical pre-
conditions on the target model (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7 - Case-based control 
The history of the execution of the model M0 is captured by other models: 
These feature left-hand patterns that are less abstracted than the source 
pattern A in M0: They are the actual inputs that triggered the production of 
predictions by M0, some having been successful (case of a0 and a1), 
some not (case of a2 – recall that |iMo means “failure of M0”). M1, M2 and 
M3 are historical pre-conditions on M0. 
Using partially instantiated models as pre-conditions introduces too much rigidity. For 
example, in the case depicted in Figure 7, only inputs matching exactly a0 or a1 will 
allow the model M0 to be executed. This means that any other input differing ever so 
slightly from the known positive evidences (a0 and a1) will be ignored. If such inputs 
were later identified as actually leading to the success of the model, then new models 
would have to be acquired and added to the system, possibly leading to an undesired 
proliferation of models. We address this issue in the following way. As experience 
accumulates, the system creates new models representing abstractions of the original 
partially instantiated models discussed so far. These new models contain more 
variables than their original and thus are able to match inputs that differ to some 
extent from known positive evidences; in that sense they are less specified and more 
flexible than their originals. The construction of flexible models is triggered by the 
accumulation of new evidences that differ from the known ones while still agreeing on 
at least one value: Such a new model is copied from the original model and 
differences between values held by the conflicting evidences are represented by 
variables introduced in the new model (see Figure 8 for an illustration). 
To illustrate the abstraction process, we will take a reasonably realistic but simplified 
example that explains some of the key principles described so far. Suppose an AERA-
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based system is interested in knowing which bus to take for going to Reykjavik 
University. Let M0 be a model saying “any bus of color C, number N and license plate 
L will go to the university“ (i.e. its left-hand pattern A has three variables C, N and L - 
its right-hand pattern B being irrelevant for the present discussion). Now assume the 
system observes four occurrences of the execution of M0, the first two being positive 
evidences and the last two negative ones: a0 = A(yellow, 19, SX445), a1 = A(yellow, 
19, KH203), a2 = A(yellow, 14, PK238) and, a3 = A(yellow, 15, UH714); see Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8 – Abstraction 
See text for details. 
The success of iM0(a0) creates the historical pre-condition M1 with a0 as its left pattern. 
Upon the success of iM0(a1), the system attempts to match a1 against known positive 
evidences, here a0: One value differs (the value of variable L) and a new pre-condition 
is created: M2 with a left pattern a4 = A(yellow,19,L). The reliability of M2 is computed 
as the number of times M2 was an effective pre-condition on M0, divided by one plus 
the number of effective pre-conditions – here 2/3. M2, M1 and M‘1 are now three 
competing pre-conditions on M0 (Figure 8-A) and their fate will depend on subsequent 
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evidences: Shall the particular cases (M1 and M‘1) turn out to be actually anecdotal (in 
our example, the license plate is actually irrelevant) then they will be dismissed on the 
basis of their relatively poor performance (or usage
5
) and the general case (M2) will 
prevail – by the means of the standard operation of prediction monitors. 
Symmetrically, the failure of iM0(a2) creates the pre-condition M3 with the left pattern 
being a2 (Figure 8-B). Upon the failure of iM0(a3), the system attempts to match of a3 
against known negative evidences (here a2): Two values differ (the values of N and L) 
and a new pre-condition is created with a5 = A(yellow, N, L) as its left pattern, M4, 
coexisting with M3 with a reliability of 2/5, calculated as in case A. The reliability of M2 
is recomputed (since new evidences have been observed) and is now also 2/5. Notice 
that another model, M5, is created and inhibits M4: The negative evidence a5 is an 
abstraction of a positive one, a4, and therefore M2 shall be prevented to be considered 
a sub-case of M4. If reality proves that only buses of line 19 actually reach the desired 
location, then M3 and M3’ will eventually be discarded, leaving only M4 to handle 
counter-evidences. 
Flexible historical pre-conditions state, essentially, that some variables are irrelevant. 
This finds an operational incarnation with respect to backward chaining: Sub-goals 
targeting atomic states containing at least one variable and derived from pairing 
super-goals with historical pre-conditions are given an expected value of zero – 
meaning that they will not trigger further chaining
6
. This translates as follows in our 
example: Saying the system is “interested” in reaching its desired location (here, an 
instance of B) means operationally that it pursues a goal G patterned after A. Now, let 
us assume the pattern A is actually a conjunction of facts – an instance of a composite 
state whose components (atomic states) would be (a) an entity with a color C, (b) 
bearing a line number N, (c) with license plate number L. Only backward chaining jobs 
triggered by the sub-goals targeting (a) and (b) would draw the system’s attention – 
goals targeting (c) would be ignored. M0 would fail to execute, but the goal G would 
still be achieved unexpectedly, thus triggering the acquisition of a new model M’0: A’  
B where A’ would be a subset of A, featuring only the variables C and N, but not L as in 
M0 (Figure 8-C). Section 5.2.2 provides a description of backward chaining through 
composite states and section 5.2.5 a detailed description of model acquisition. A 
system operating as in this example with limited resources would naturally focus on 
the (goal-)relevant inputs and produce more efficient models: (a) M’0 is more focused 
than the models depicted in case B – it requires less computing power, inputs and 
time to match its LT (two variables instead of three) and, (b) we would now have only 
one single model instead of four (which again demands less CPU, inputs, and time). 
We close this section on a last technical note about time. One major source of 
uncertainty is the time at which events occur. Too rigid a temporal prediction 
production scheme would result in many model failures – the world never repeats 
itself, at least not at the microsecond scale – and eventually, would result in the 
dismissal of models that, under less stringent precision constraints, would be more 
accurate. We address this issue in the following way: When inputs are successfully 
matched against abstract pre-conditions, the time guards thereof are recalculated 
using the average of the time intervals of the evidences. If some models eventually 
turn out to capture generality – meaning in this context that their predictions shall 
actually be robust to variations of the execution timings – then the aforementioned 
guard adjustment will trade precision for accuracy. Conversely, if reality calls for 
precision – i.e. the scope of models is temporally narrower and their predictions more 
brittle with respect to the execution timings – then this will be reflected in the 
evidences on which they were based: These will present lesser timings variations and 
                                                 
5
 As introduced in section 4.1, models can be dismissed when they become the least recently 
used. 
6
 Implementation-wise, such goals will not even be produced. 
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the less general models in question would remain as precise as need be, while 
retaining accuracy. 
5 Architecture 
We now turn to describe the set of programs that implement the principal higher-level 
cognitive functions of the architecture, learning, planning, and attentional control. 
As already described, the main components of AERA are its executive and memory, 
the latter containing inputs (both external and internal), predictions, goals, programs 
(models, monitors, etc.) and a collection of jobs. The executive uses these elements 
to (a) maintain and improve the system by adding/removing models to/from the 
memory, and by (b) controlling the priorities of all the jobs while (c) achieving the 
goals the system has set itself to fulfill the drives (top-level goals) given by the 
programmer. 
Figure 9 – Architecture 
Besides low-level technical components (scheduler, threads, etc.) the 
executive contains (fixed) algorithms, that are parameterized by jobs, to 
create programs such as chaining, monitoring, and pattern extraction 
programs (defined in section 5.2). Models and composite states are also 
programs, even though they don’t result from any parameterization: They 
are instead either given in the bootstrap code (shown here in grey), or 
learned. The inputs of the system consist of (a) sensory inputs, (b) goals 
and predictions produced by jobs and, (c) internal inputs produced by the 
executive (including instantiated models, instantiated composite states, 
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success/failure of goals and predictions, performance assessments, etc., 
as explained in the preceding sections). Drives also constitute inputs, and 
are given in the bootstrap code (in grey). 
A running AERA system faces three main challenges: (a) To update and revise its 
knowledge based on its experience, (b) to cope with its resource limitation while 
making decisions to satisfy its drives and, (c) to focus its attention on the most 
important inputs, discarding the rest or saving them for later processing. These three 
challenges are commonly addressed by, respectively, learning, planning, and 
controlling the attention of the system. Notice that all of these activities have an 
associated cost and have to be carried out concurrently. All these activities fit to some 
extent into the resource- and knowledge budget the system has at its disposal. That is 
the reason why they have been designed to result from the fine-grained interoperation 
of a multitude of lower-level jobs, the ordering of which is enforced by a scheduling 
strategy. This strategy has been designed to get the maximal global value for the 
system from the available inputs, knowledge, and resources, given (potentially 
conflicting) necessities. The list of jobs, their purpose, and scheduling priorities, is 
given in section 5.2. 
 Learning 5.1.1
Learning involves several phases: Acquiring new models, evaluating the performance 
of existing ones, and controlling the learning activity itself. Acquiring new models is 
referred to as pattern extraction, and consists of the identification of causal 
relationships between input pairs: Inputs which exhibit correlation are turned into 
patterns and used as the LT and RT of a new model. Model acquisition is triggered by 
either the unpredicted success of a goal or the failure of a prediction. In both cases 
AERA will consider the unpredicted outcome as the RT of new models and explore 
buffers of historical inputs to find suitable LTs. Once models have been produced, the 
system has to monitor their performance (a) to identify and delete unreliable models 
and, (b) to update the reliability as this control value is essential for scheduling (as 
described in section 4.3 above). Both these activities – model acquisition and revision 
– have an associated cost, and the system must allocate its limited resources to the 
jobs from which it expects the most value. Last but not least, the system is enticed to 
learn, based on its experience, about its progress in modeling inputs. The system 
computes and maintains the history of the success rate for classes of goals and 
predictions, and the priority of jobs dedicated to acquire new models is proportional to 
the first derivative of this success rate (this is detailed in section 5.2.5). 
 Planning  5.1.2
Planning concerns observing desired inputs (the states specified by goals) by acting 
on the environment (i.e. issuing commands) to achieve goals in due time in 
adversarial conditions, like for example the lack of appropriate models, under-
performing models, conflicting or redundant goals, and lack of relevant inputs. 
Planning is initiated and sustained by the regular injection of drives (as defined by the 
programmer), thus putting the system under constant pressure from both its drives 
and its inputs. In our approach, sub-goals derived from goals are simulated, meaning 
that as long as time allows, the system will run “what if” scenarios to predict the 
outcome of the hypothetical success of these simulated goals, checking for conflicts 
and redundancies, eventually committing to the best goals found so far and discarding 
other contenders. Here again, goals are rated with respect to their expected value. 
Simulation and commitment operate concurrently with (and also make direct use of) 
forward and backward chaining. 
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 Attentional Control 5.1.3
A cognitive system generally does not have enough time to process all the inputs it 
receives, whether from its sensors or in the form of internal inputs, and thus must 
make a choice to focus its computational resources on the most relevant ones at any 
point in time. The "interest" or importance of an input depends on the global activity of 
the system, that is, the set of jobs scheduled to process the input in question: 
Interesting inputs are the ones processed by high-priority jobs. In our approach, 
attentional control results directly from its scheduling mechanism, through re-ordering 
of jobs in accordance with their priorities. Attention, as implemented in in AERA, is 
transversal and job-independent: The same attention control is uniformly used for all 
and any kinds of jobs in the system. For example, attention is required for learning 
new models but also – at the same time – for planning appropriate courses of action. 
Attention control is not exclusively based on job priorities, as it results also from 
selecting proactively sources of inputs in the environment by manipulating the sensing 
devices. This is achieved by configuring the various sensors the systems has at its 
disposal by means of issuing commands, computed by backward chaining jobs that 
are themselves derived from the models, i.e. the procedural knowledge the system 
has learned (or has been given) so far. All jobs are intertwined in the scheduler’s list 
and therefore contribute altogether to the focus of attention, via the definition of their 
priority values. As emphasized in section 4.3, job priorities are ultimately derived from 
the expected value of the system’s goals, that is to say that the attentional control is 
explicitly goal-driven. 
5.2 Programs 
This section presents the various types of programs that implement the cognitive 
functions mentioned above. As described above, a program is a small component of 
the architecture that specifies one or several input patterns – for example, a model is 
one type of program. A job results from the pairing of one input and one program: This 
is triggered by pattern matching, which is performed continually by the executive, 
each time an input or a program is injected in the system. Once created, a job awaits 
execution. If it is eventually executed, the resulting process cannot be interrupted nor 
preempted at the architecture level.
7
 The execution of a job can produce new terms 
that constitute inputs for the system (for example, goals and predictions), thus 
triggering pattern matching and therefore the creation of new daughter jobs. Before 
being executed, a job can be cancelled for various reasons – the most frequent 
reasons being (a) its input is cancelled, for example, when resolving the conflict 
between two goals, the system will cancel one of these goals and the jobs for which it 
was the input, (b) the program it results from is deleted (for example, models can be 
deleted if their performance becomes unsatisfactory) and, (c) its priority drops down to 
zero. 
Programs are created dynamically by jobs. Creating a program means parameterizing 
an algorithm with a specific input pattern – such algorithms are fixed and are part of 
the executive, with the two notable exceptions of models and composite states, which 
are either defined by the programmer as part of the bootstrap code, or learned. For 
example, when a job produces a prediction from an input and a model, a monitoring 
program is created to assess the outcome of that very prediction: It will react to inputs 
that are evidences (or counter-evidences) of the predicted fact and update the 
reliability of the model accordingly. Programs are deleted when they become useless; 
for example, monitors are deleted when the deadline of the expected fact is reached, 
                                                 
7 In our current implementation the thread that a job belongs to is still subjected to the operating 
system’s scheduling events. 
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and models are deleted when they become too unreliable (see more details on this in 
section 5.2.3). 
The architecture uses two kinds of jobs: priority-controlled jobs (like the ones 
presented in section 4.3 above) and time-triggered jobs. The execution of the latter is 
not governed by priorities but is triggered by time events – technically they are locked 
on timers. These jobs are executed immediately upon triggering and are dedicated to 
perform timely assessments of expected or desired states. For example, they assert 
the success or failure of predictions at their deadlines based on the evidences 
accumulated so far (see sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4). 
 Model 5.2.1
As already mentioned, a model is a program that, when paired with an input matching 
its LT, produces a forward chaining job and, when paired with an input matching its 
RT, produces a backward chaining job. These jobs have been introduced in section 
4.3 above and are now complemented with greater details. 
Forward chaining through models is the processing of one input matching the LT of a 
model to produce a prediction patterned after its RT. In addition to the prediction 
another term is produced, an instantiated model, i.e. a trace of the (forward) execution 
of the model thus instantiated, its input and its output. As mentioned earlier, such a 
trace of execution constitutes an internal input and can be abstracted to form a 
pattern that in turn can be embedded in any model as its pre- and post-conditions. In 
case a model has pre-conditions, the executive checks if these conditions are met 
before executing the model. If so, chaining occurs as described above, otherwise the 
prediction is produced in silent mode, meaning that both the model execution and the 
prediction itself will be invisible to other programs. The purpose of this mode is to 
monitor the outcome of the prediction and possibly register an unexpected success or 
failure of the pre-conditions, which will trigger the acquisition of new models (see 
section 5.2.5). For each prediction, a prediction monitoring program is created (see 
section 5.2.3) to assess the outcome of the prediction. The job priority for forward 
chaining has already been given in section 4.3, Equation 6. 
Backward chaining through models is the processing of one input matching the RT of 
a model to produce a sub-goal if the input is a goal or an assumption otherwise. 
Before committing to a particular goal the system needs to evaluate its possible 
outcomes to detect and resolve potential conflicts with other goals, and also to select 
the best next sub-goal when there are multiple ways to achieve it. When a sub-goal is 
produced from a super-goal it is tagged with a simulation mark until it is either 
cancelled (for example when it conflicts with other more important goals) or committed 
to. Each time a simulated goal is produced a corresponding prediction is also 
produced: This prediction is also marked as a simulation and is used by the system to 
evaluate the consequences of reaching the (simulated) goal in question. Simulated 
predictions do not trigger the creation of prediction monitors, as no actual event can 
be expected to confirm the prediction. In case a model has pre-conditions the 
backward chaining job is not produced before the conditions are met. For each goal a 
goal monitoring program is created (see section 5.2.4) to assess the outcome of that 
goal (whether simulated or actual). If the input of the job is not a goal, then the system 
will assume an instance of the LT, with a likelihood computed as for a goal (section 
4.3, Equation 7). 
 Composite state 5.2.2
As introduced in section 4.1, a composite state encodes the conjunction of several 
facts, including facts whose payloads are instances of other composite states, thus 
allowing the creation of structural hierarchies. A composite state is a program with 
several input patterns, one per fact. Like models, composite states produce forward 
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and backward chaining jobs when paired with some inputs. 
Forward chaining through composite states is triggered by the matching of one input 
(any kind but goals) with one of the patterns. This in turn produces a new composite 
state, namely a partial composite state, copied from the original, with one input 
pattern less (the one that has been matched by the input, hence the term “partial”) – 
note that the original is not deleted and remains a legitimate target for matching more 
inputs. When a partial composite state has only one input pattern left un-matched and 
matches an input with that pattern, then the executive produces an internal input, e.g. 
an instantiated composite state, which indicates that an instance of the conjunction of 
facts specified by the composite state has been observed. If one of the inputs was a 
prediction then the instantiated composite state becomes a prediction instead of a 
mere fact. The likelihood of the instantiated composite state is the lowest likelihood of 
all the inputs that were matched. Composite states are deleted if they have no input 
pattern left or if the late deadline of one of the inputs they matched has been reached. 
The priority of a forward chaining job through a composite state is defined as for a 
model (Equation 6) where the composite state is substituted for the model in the Utility 
function. 
Backward chaining through composite states is triggered in two conditions. First, a 
goal matching one input pattern of a composite state triggers the production of other 
goals patterned after the input patterns that have not been matched yet (even though 
these goals are in effect “side-goals” of the incoming goal, for practical reasons they 
are treated as sub-goals). The rationale behind this behavior is to entice the system to 
find situations (conjunctions of facts) that include the goal’s target state: Composite 
states are learned as conjunctions of facts that explain unpredicted states (see 
section 5.2.5) so it is not a bad idea to try to replicate such a conjunction as targeting 
one component thereof may entail the observation of another of these components. 
For example, if we encode in a composite state several attributes of a given entity – 
say, a bus of a certain color, with a license plate and a line number – then, when 
trying to find one of these attributes (for example, when trying to spot a bus) 
uncovering its related attributes may be helpful – in this example, finding a bus will be 
easier when also trying to find objects with a license plate and a line number. The 
second case that triggers backward chaining is when a goal targets the instantiation 
of a composite state instead of one of the state’s individual components. In that case, 
backward chaining occurs as in the first case and applies to the partial states 
corresponding to the state the system seeks to instantiate. The priority of a backward 
chaining job through a composite state is defined as for a model (Equation 7) where 
the composite state is substituted for the model in the Utility function. 
 Prediction Monitor 5.2.3
A prediction monitor has one input pattern, the prediction it monitors. Pairing one 
actual input (i.e. a sensory or internal input) with the prediction monitor creates a 
prediction monitoring job. The priority of a prediction monitoring job is the same as the 
priority of its mother job (a forward chaining job). The purpose of a prediction monitor 
is threefold. 
First it accumulates evidences or counter-evidences of the predicted fact during the 
predicted time interval, to assess the performance of the model that made the 
prediction by increasing or decreasing its reliability. Among the accumulated 
evidences, the evidence (or counter-evidence) holding the highest likelihood value 
dictates the judgment. If no evidences and no counter-evidences of what was 
predicted have been observed, then a failure is declared. The assessment is 
performed by a time-triggered job – a prediction assessment job - at the late deadline 
of the prediction. This job produces an internal input, a fact indicating the success or 
failure of the model. In case of a failure, all the predictions that have been produced 
directly or indirectly from the failed prediction are cancelled and so are the jobs for 
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which they are the input. 
If the reliability of a model drops below a threshold THR1 then it is phased out: In this 
mode the model can only create forward chaining jobs and produce silent predictions 
that will not be eligible inputs to the regular models (i.e. models that are not phased 
out). Silent predictions are still monitored, thus giving the possibility to improve to a 
model that was recently getting unreliable. If the reliability of a phased out model gets 
above THR1, then it is not phased out anymore and resumes its standard operation. 
When the reliability of a phased out model drops below a second threshold THR2 
(THR2 < THR1) then the model is deleted as are all the programs that were created to 
manage its productions; the corresponding jobs are cancelled. The way the reliability 
is defined (see Equation 2) brings some undesired inertia to the switching of modes of 
operation (phased in or phased out): The more a model has accumulated experience, 
the more it needs to accumulate future contrary experience to switch modes, because 
the environment may have changed, making a model temporarily irrelevant but not 
generally faulty. To address this we implemented a mechanism for reducing switching 
inertia: In the main, it determines the switch based on reliability computed temporarily 
using a reference fixed number of evidences
8
, instead of the actual and large number 
of evidences. 
The second purpose of a prediction monitor is to maintain abstractions, as described 
in section 4.4: Upon the success or failure of a prediction produced by a model, the 
history of the execution of the model is updated, with the possible addition of new pre-
conditions. 
The third and last purpose of a prediction monitor is to produce evidences of the 
absence of expected facts: If, at the deadline of the prediction, no evidence of the 
expected fact has been observed, then the prediction assessment job produces a 
counter-fact holding the payload of the expected fact. The absence of evidence can 
result from two causes: Either the environment did not provide such evidences, or it 
actually did but the system failed to sense them (jobs processing such evidences 
were cancelled). The likelihood of the latter case is reflected by giving a likelihood 
value to the counter-fact computed as the utility of the model (see section 4.3, 
Equation 6). 
 Goal Monitor 5.2.4
A goal monitor has one input pattern, the goal it monitors. Pairing one input with the 
goal monitor creates a goal monitoring job. The priority of a goal monitoring job is the 
same as the one of its mother job (a backward chaining job). Goal monitors come in 
two variants, one that monitor actual goals (goals already committed to) and one that 
monitors simulated goals. 
The purpose of an actual goal monitor is to check if the goal has been achieved or 
not. To do so, a goal monitor accumulates evidences or counter-evidences of the 
desired fact and, at the late deadline of the goal, a time-triggered job – a goal 
assessment job – is created to establish the outcome of the goal in the form of an 
internal input indicating the success or failure of the goal. The decision is based on 
the evidence (or counter-evidence) holding the greatest likelihood value. When a goal 
succeeds or fails, its sub-goals are cancelled and so are the corresponding chaining 
and monitoring jobs.  
In addition to recording evidences of the success or failure of a goal, a simulated goal 
monitor also records evidences of the impact of the monitored goal on the success or 
                                                 
8
 Each time the reliability of a model changes, another temporary version of said reliability is 
computed, using an arbitrary evidence count (defined as a parameter of the system) and a 
commensurate positive evidence count. 
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failure of its super-goal. Such evidences are simulated predictions: Assuming 
temporarily that a goal’s target is achieved, the system predicts the hypothetical 
outcomes using forward chaining. Simulated predictions reference the simulated goal 
that triggered them and are eligible inputs for actual goal monitoring as they are 
required for the actual goal monitor to predict the impact of simulated goals on its own 
outcome. 
The decision to commit or not to a simulated goal (G) is based on predictions of its 
impact on actual goals and requires the super-goal (G0) to be an actual goal. The 
rules of commitment are (using the commit time as the evaluation time): 
- If there are no predictions of failure of an actual goal, commit to G. 
- If there is a prediction of the failure of an actual goal G1 (i.e. there is a 
conflict between G0 and G1), and G1 has a greater expected value than 
G0, then cancel G, otherwise commit to G. Notice that if all sub-goals of 
G0 were to be cancelled, then G0 would probably fail
9
, which would be 
expected since it would mean that, achieving G0 using the current 
knowledge conflicts with more important goals. 
- If there is a prediction of the success of G0 resulting from a goal G2 that is 
not a sub-goal of G (G and G2 are redundant) and which has a greater 
expected value than G, then cancel G. 
The decision to commit is triggered by an event described in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10 – Simulation and commitment 
Goals are monitored by jobs (shown as rounded rectangles) 
accumulating evidences (or predictions thereof) of their target states 
being reached (for clarity, only one job per goal is shown here). The 
figure depicts a path in a goal hierarchy constituted by an actual goal (g0) 
and three successive sub-goals, the last of which (g3) targets a 
command. 
A. If the model having produced g3 has no pre-conditions – or if it does, 
should these already have been met or predicted – an assessment job 
(shown in grey) is triggered at the early deadline of g3 and sends a 
commit signal to the first simulated goal in the path (g1). 
B. If the system commits to g1, the commit signal is propagated down the 
path of the hierarchy g3 belongs to. Otherwise, g1’s goal monitor will 
attempt to commit upon the matching of relevant inputs, in addition to its 
standard role of accumulating evidences of the goal’s achievement. This 
additional behavior will cease when g3 is cancelled. 
                                                 
9
 Unless of course an unforeseen event happens to match G0’s target state, in which case G0 
would succeed. 
 
  
  
    
t 
 
  
  
  
commit commit 
A B 
g1 
g
0
 
g
3
 
g
2
 
  
  
  
  
execute 
C 
RUTR-SCS13006        30/56 
C. If the system commit to g2, the command held by g3 is executed. 
Otherwise g2’s goal monitor behaves as in case B. 
 Targeted Pattern Extractor 5.2.5
A pattern extractor is a program that is generated dynamically upon the creation of a 
goal or a prediction. Its main activity is to produce models, i.e. explanations for the 
unpredicted success of a goal or the failure of a prediction: these are called the 
signaling events that trigger the building of models. A single targeted pattern extractor 
(TPX) is responsible for attempting to explain either the success of one given goal, or 
the failure of one given prediction. Said goal or prediction is called the TPX's target. 
Under our assumption of insufficient knowledge, explaining in this case is much closer 
to guessing than to proving, and guesses are based on the general heuristic “time 
precedence indicates causality”. Models thus built by the TPXs are added to the 
memory and are subjected to evaluation by prediction monitors: Their life cycle is 
governed essentially by their performance. 
A TPX accumulates inputs from the target production time until the deadline of the 
target, at which time it analyses its buffer to produce models if needed: The TPX 
activity is thus composed of two phases, (a) buffering relevant inputs and, (b) 
extracting models from the buffer. 
During the first phase, pairing one input with a TPX creates a TPX-accumulation job 
which merely adds the input to the TPX buffer for further processing. Input relevancy 
is defined by its utility, computed as the greatest of the utility values of all models in 
the system that matched the input in question: 
𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑥, 𝑡) = {
Max
𝑖
(𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑚𝑖(𝑥), 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠, 𝑡)) , if positive
𝑈, otherwise
 
Where 𝑥 is an input, 𝑡 the time the function is evaluated, and 𝑚𝑖(𝑥, 𝑡) all 
the models that matched 𝑥  with their respective LTs at time  𝑡 . 𝑈 (𝑈 ∈
[0,1[) is a parameter of the system meant to give a chance to inputs that 
don’t match any model to still be considered for model building, if 
resources allow. 
Equation 8 
The priority of a TPX-accumulation job is proportional to the input’s utility, which 
means that inputs with lower utility will be less likely to be buffered and therefore, that 
they will be less likely considered for building models. The priority of a TPX-
accumulation job also depends on the utility of the model that produced its target, of 
the incentive of learning said target (defined below) and of a decay function depending 
on the input found in the buffer. The success rate of the class of goals and predictions 
it produces are monitored – classes are merely abstracted instances of goals or 
predictions. The success rate of a class is the number of positive evidences (for goals, 
the number of times an instance of the goal class was achieved and for predictions, 
the number of times instances of the prediction class were successful), divided by the 
total number of evidences (the number of instances of the class). When the target is a 
prediction, the incentive for learning depends on the unexplained decrease of the 
success rate of the prediction’s class: 
𝐿𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑐, 𝑡) =
𝑒+(𝑐,𝑡)
𝑒(𝑐,𝑡)
 𝑎𝑛𝑑  
∆𝑆𝑅(𝑐, 𝑡) = 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑐, 𝑡) − Max
𝑡𝑟≤𝑡
(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑐, 𝑡𝑟)) 
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒(𝑐, 𝑡) = {
−𝐿 × ∆𝑆𝑅(𝑐, 𝑡), ∆𝑆𝑅(𝑐, 𝑡) < −𝐿𝑇𝐻𝑅
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
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𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑐, 𝑥, 𝑡)
= 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒(𝑐, 𝑡) × 𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑚, 𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑠, 𝑡0(𝑥))
× 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑥, 𝑡) 
Where 𝑐 is a class of predictions, 𝑒+(𝑐, 𝑡)  the number of positive 
evidences of 𝑐 being achieved, 𝑒(𝑐, 𝑡) the total number of evidences both 
evaluated at 𝑡, 𝑡 being the time the function is computed, 𝑥 a prediction, 
instance of 𝑐 and 𝑚 the model that produced 𝑥. 𝑡0(𝑥) is the time when 𝑥 
was produced by 𝑚. 𝐿𝑇𝐻𝑅 is a threshold defined as a parameter of the 
system. It is necessary to keep all jobs´ priorities commensurate: 𝐿 is a 
parameter of the system defined to set the importance of |𝐿 × ∆𝑆𝑅(𝑐, 𝑡)| 
relatively to the 𝑈𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦  function used to compute the priorities of all 
non-TPX jobs. 
Equation 9 
When the target is a goal, the incentive for learning depends on the unexplained 
increase of the success rate of the goal’s class: 
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒(𝑐, 𝑡) = {
𝐿 × ∆𝑆𝑅(𝑐, 𝑡), ∆𝑆𝑅(𝑐, 𝑡) > 𝐿𝑇𝐻𝑅
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑐, 𝑥, 𝑡)
= 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒(𝑐, 𝑡)
× 𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑚, 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠, 𝑡0(𝑥)) × 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑥, 𝑡) 
Where 𝑐  is a class of goals, 𝑥  a goal, instance of 𝑐 , and all other 
parameters and functions are defined as in Equation 9 above. 
Equation 10 
At the deadline of the target, buffering stops, and the buffer is analyzed as follows, 
when the target is a goal (the procedure is similar for predictions, see below): 
1 If one input is the trace of the execution of one model that predicted the 
goal’s target state, abort – this means that the success was already 
predicted. 
2 Remove any inputs that triggered any model execution. 
3 Remove any inputs that were assembled in composite states. 
4 Reorder the buffer according to the early deadlines of the inputs
10
. 
5 For each input remaining in the buffer create a TPX-extraction job, the 
purpose of which is to assemble a new model from the input and the target. 
Shall the target be a prediction, on the other hand, step 1 would be: 
1 If one input is the trace of the execution of one model that predicted a 
counter-evidence of the prediction’s target state, abort, as the failure was 
already predicted. 
Reaching step 5 triggers the second phase of TPX activity, where models are built 
from inputs found in the buffer. The construction of a new model is performed - by a 
TPX-extraction job - as follows, when the target is a goal: 
1 The target is abstracted
11
 and forms the RT of a new model (let's call it 
M0). If the input assigned to the TPX-extraction job is synchronized with 
                                                 
10
 The buffering time of an input is the time at which a TPX-accumulation job was executed, 
which may not be the same time as the deadline of the input 
11
 Here, abstraction means replacing values by variables. 
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other inputs (that is, if their time intervals overlap), then all these inputs are 
assembled into a single new composite state: this new state is chosen as 
the LT of the model. Otherwise, the input is abstracted and forms the LT of 
the model. Notice that new states are identified when their parts are 
needed for the models being built (instead of resulting from blind temporal 
correlation): Using composite states as models’ LT instead of just atomic 
states fosters the building of structural hierarchies. 
2 If, in a model, some variables in the RT (or in the LT) are not present in the 
LT (or in the RT), then the job attempts to build guards (see below) to bind 
these to known variables; otherwise, stop. 
3 If some variables in a model are still not bound, then if the buffer is still not 
exhausted, goto step 4; otherwise, goto step 5. 
4 The job considers the next older input to build another model (M1) whose 
RT is an instance of M0; the unbounded variables in M0 are passed from M1 
to M0 as parameters of M0. The execution of M1 allows the execution of M0: 
M1 is a positive pre-condition on M0. Goto step 2. 
5 All models are deleted that hold variables representing deadlines that are 
unaccounted for, i.e. variables that cannot be computed neither from the LT 
or RT, nor from the model’s parameters list. These models are deleted 
since they would produce predictions with unbound deadlines, i.e. 
predictions that cannot be monitored. 
If the target was a prediction, then the signaling event would be a failure. Technically 
this means that M1 mentioned above would have its RT being the failure of the 
execution of M0, in other words, the execution of M1 would inhibit the execution of M0: 
M1 would then be a negative pre-condition on M0. 
As with TPX-accumulation jobs, the priority of a TPX-extraction job is a function of the 
utility of the model that produced its target and of the incentive of learning said target. 
It also depends on a decay function. When the target is a prediction, the TPX-
extraction job’s priority is: 
𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑦(𝑡, 𝑥) = {
𝑡0(𝑥) − 𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝐻𝑍
+ 1, 𝑡 < 𝑡0(𝑥) + 𝐿𝑇𝐻𝑍
       0,         𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑐, 𝑥, 𝑡)
= 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒(𝑐, 𝑡)             
× 𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑚, 𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑠, 𝑡0(𝑥)) × 𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑦(𝑡, 𝑥) 
Where 𝑐 is a class of predictions, 𝑒+(𝑐, 𝑡)  the number of positive 
evidences of 𝑐 being achieved, 𝑒(𝑐, 𝑡) the total number of evidences both 
evaluated at 𝑡, 𝑡 being the time the function is computed, 𝑥 a prediction, 
instance of 𝑐 and 𝑚 the model that produced 𝑥. 𝑡0(𝑥) is the time when 𝑥 
was produced by 𝑚 . The 𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑦  function depends on a system 
parameter,𝐿𝑇𝐻𝑍, and ensures the job will be cancelled after 𝑡0(𝑥)+ 𝐿𝑇𝐻𝑍. 
Equation 11 
When the target is a goal, the TPX-extraction job’s priority is: 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑐, 𝑥, 𝑡)
= 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒(𝑐, 𝑡)
× 𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑚, 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠, 𝑡0(𝑥)) × 𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑦(𝑡, 𝑥) 
Where 𝑐  is a class of goals, 𝑥  a goal, instance of 𝑐 , and all other 
parameters and functions are defined as in Equation 11 above. 
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Equation 12 
Models contain guards (introduced in section 4.1) and these must be produced from 
the inputs through induction – for now we limit ourselves to the induction of invertible 
linear functions of the general form 𝑦 = 𝑎 × 𝑥 + 𝑏  where 𝑎 , 𝑥 , and 𝑏  are either 
variables of the model or constants. The construction of guards proceeds by 
attempting to match input data and some guard templates defined by the executive. 
We will assume that models come in the form: 
(𝐿𝑇(𝑄0, 𝑄1, … , 𝑄𝑛 , 𝑇0, 𝑇1), 𝑅𝑇(𝑃0, 𝑃1, … , 𝑃𝑚 , 𝑇2, 𝑇3))  where 𝑄𝑖 and 𝑃𝑗 are variables 
representing arbitrary quantities, 𝑇0 and 𝑇1 are variables that define the time interval 
within which L holds, and 𝑇2  and 𝑇3  variables defining the time interval for R. The 
templates currently implemented are given in the following list (an upper case symbol 
denotes a variable, whereas the same symbol in lower case indicates the value from 
which the variable has been abstracted; “forward” indicates guards controlling forward 
chaining; “backward” indicates guards controlling backward chaining). 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐴 
𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑: 𝑇2 = 𝑇0 + 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑, 𝑇3 = 𝑇1 + 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 
𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑: 𝑇0 = 𝑇2 − 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑, 𝑇1 = 𝑇3 − 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 
Where 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 = 𝑡2 − 𝑡0. 
 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐵 
𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑: 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑄𝑗 + 𝑄𝑘 × 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 
𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑: 𝑄𝑘 =
(𝑃𝑖 − 𝑄𝑗)
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑
 
Where 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 is defined as above. 
 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶, 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝐿𝑇 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑛𝑜 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑: 𝑇0 = 𝑇2 − 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑, 𝑇1 = 𝑇3 − 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 
Where 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  is defined as usual (here, the period is actually the 
duration of the command). 
 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐷, 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝐿𝑇 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑  
𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑: 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑄𝑗 × 𝑄𝑘 
𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑: 𝑄𝑘 =
𝑃𝑖
𝑄𝑗
 
Notice that the 𝑄𝑖𝑠 are the command arguments. 
 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐸, 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝐿𝑇 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑: 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑄𝑗 + 𝑄𝑘 
𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑: 𝑄𝑘 = 𝑃𝑖 − 𝑄𝑗 
 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐹 
𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑: 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑄𝑗 × 𝑐 
𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑: 𝑄𝑘 =
𝑃𝑖
𝑐
 
Where 𝑐 =
𝑝𝑖
𝑞𝑖
. 
 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐹 
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𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑: 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑄𝑗 + 𝑐 
𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑: 𝑄𝑘 = 𝑃𝑖 − 𝑐 
Where 𝑐 = 𝑝𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖. 
Equation 13 
Notice that several templates can be used to identify the guards of a single model. 
5.3 Self-modeling and Self-control 
Self-monitoring is the production by the system of data describing the computation of 
the system. These data are generated automatically by the executive; they are: 
- notifications of the productions of models, 
- success and failure of goals and predictions, 
- notifications of the data used for assembling composite states, 
- notifications of instantiated models, 
- periodic measurements of the scheduling performance. These are for 
example the average deadline overshoots for time-triggered jobs, the 
percentage of jobs cancelled over the total load, along with priority 
thresholds under which jobs have been cancelled, per kind of job, along with 
their urgency, the utility value of their program and the likelihood of their 
inputs. 
Such data constitute internal inputs for the system itself and at the elementary level of 
modeling causal relations, allow capturing pre- and post-conditions on model 
execution, as introduced in section 4.2. At the higher levels of system control, these 
internal inputs can also constitute external inputs for meta-systems, i.e. systems in 
charge of controlling the former one (as introduced in section 3). Periodic 
measurements of the scheduling performance may indicate possible congestion, i.e. 
insufficient resources with regards to the jobs at hand. In this case, it is the 
responsibility of a meta-system (or the system itself) to take contingency measures. 
These are, for example: 
- increase the threshold on terms’ likelihood (defined in section 4.3). Goals, 
predictions and assumptions will be more likely to fall under said threshold, 
thus limiting the depth of the chaining; 
- increase the thresholds THR1 and THR2 that control respectively the 
switching of phased in/out models and the deletion of the phased out ones 
(see section 5.2.3). This will decrease the number of models in active duty 
(phased in) and thus reduce the number of chaining jobs. 
- activate the LRU-based garbage collector (introduced in section 4.1). To 
activate the garbage collector, one specifies a threshold on the least recent 
time models have been used (e.g. they produced confirmed predictions). 
Decreasing this threshold reduces the number of models and therefore, 
reduces the system’s load. 
- lower the priority of some drives. This will delay or cancel the achievement of 
the sub-goals stemming from these drives and reduce the overall workload 
of the system, that is, the number of all the jobs concerned with chaining, 
monitoring, etc. 
Even though self-modeling for meta-control has not been leveraged in our S1 
demonstrator, this functionality has been implemented and is operational. As we have 
argued before (Steunebrink et al. 2013, Thórisson 2012) such functionality is a 
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necessity for a developmental system poised to adapt and make the best use of its 
resources. With it a system can, for example, model the ways it routinely adopts for 
achieving some particular goals: This consists of modeling sequences of model 
execution – these are observable in the form of internal inputs – and, by design, can 
be modeled using the existing learning mechanisms. The benefit of modeling 
sequences of execution can be, among others, to enable the system to compile such 
sequences so as to replace a set of models, which normally have to be interpreted by 
the executive, with a faster (but also more rigid) equivalent native machine code. Thus 
self-compilation supports a lower-level re-encoding of useful and reliable knowledge, 
which we expect will increase the scalability of AERA. 
6 Evaluation & Experimental 
Results 
Two experiments are reported here. Experiment 1 (E1) was conceived as a pilot, with 
the aim of exploring the complexity that the system might be able to handle. In terms 
of what S1 must learn (described in sections 6.2.1 and 6.3.1), E1 is a strict subset of 
experiment 2 (E2). In both experiments two humans interact for some time, allowing 
S1 to observe their behavior and interaction; in both experiments S1's task is to learn 
how to conduct the interaction in exactly the same way as the humans do, in either 
role of interviewer or interviewee. The knowledge given to S1 is represented as a 
small set of primitive commands and categories of sensory data, along with no more 
than a few top-level goals such as "pleasing the interviewer" (operationally defined as 
the interviewer saying "thank you" or asking a new question). Details on these are 
given in section 6.2. 
Our results are analyzed using t-patterns (Magnusson 1996, 2000; Jonsson & 
Thórisson 2010; Thórisson et al. 2013), a method for extracting hierarchies of 
significant temporal patterns in multi-dimensional source data. Unlike more simplistic 
statistical measurements, the t-pattern approach we use for analyzing the results of 
E2 has the unusual feature of giving a rather holistic picture of the overall behavior of 
the system it is applied to. For readers unfamiliar with this technique we refer to 
Magnusson (1996, 2000) and Thorisson & Magnusson (2013). The patterns emerging 
in t-pattern analysis are dependent on three factors: The source material itself, how 
well it is coded, and the settings of particular analysis parameters. Our source 
material was a direct recording of the real-time events in the graphical world, i.e. a 
trace of the human and machine actions in the virtual world frame-by-frame; the 
coding of the recordings was done by coders with years of experience in this 
methodology. Parameter settings for all analysis were as follows: Minimum number of 
occurrences set at 3 and significance level set at 0.0005 unless otherwise noted; 
other values were set at default (see Magnusson 2006).  
First we describe the experimental setup and interaction scenario, then present the 
results of the two experiments. 
6.1 Experimental & Scenario Setup 
In both experiments S1 observes real-time interaction between two humans in the 
simulated equivalent of a videoconference: The humans are represented as avatars in 
a virtual environment (Figure 11) – each human sees the other as an avatar on their 
screen. Their head and arm movements are tracked with motion-sensing technology, 
their speech recorded with microphones. Signals from the motion-tracking are used to 
update the state of their avatars in real-time, so that everything one human does is 
translated virtually instantly into movements of her graphical avatar on the other's 
screen. Between the avatars is a desk with objects on it, visible to both participants. 
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One human is assigned the role of an interviewer (Hq), the other the role of an 
interviewee (Ha); the goal of their interaction is collaborative dialogue involving the 
objects in front of them.  
 
Figure 11 – Data recording setup for face-to-face interview. 
During learning by observation S1 observes two humans interacting and 
subsequently replaces one of them to allow the interaction to proceed as 
before. The natural interaction between two human participants (H) is 
mediated via a video-conference virtual-world setup, where participant Hq 
appears on the monitor of participant Ha as an avatar (hq), and vice 
versa. One is an interviewer asking questions (Hq), the other an 
interviewee giving answers (Ha) on the subject of recycling. Their 
behavior is motion-tracked and used to drive the movements of their 
avatars; speech is collected via microphones and piped to the speaker on 
the other's monitor. S1 can replace either human and conduct the 
interaction in an identical manner. 
The data produced during their interaction is represented as follows. Body 
movements is represented as coordinate changes of labeled body parts of the 
avatars, in {x, y, z, p, q, r} of the coordinate system of the virtual world used. Each 
audio signal is piped to two processes: an instance of a speech recognizer (Microsoft 
SAPI 5.3), and to an instance of the Prosodica prosody analyzer (Nivel & Thórisson 
2008). The speech recognition is augmented with timestamps on the words produced 
(approximate accuracy of time-stamping typically +/-100 ms or better), and (in E2) 
filtered through a set of 100 allowed words (necessary due to the many false positives 
produced in live interaction). Words time-stamped with the estimated time-of-
utterance are typically output as intermediate hypotheses between 200 and 1000 
milliseconds of being uttered, with a "final guess" delivered for each audio segment 
after a 200 millisecond silence is detected. The prosody analyzer produces time-
stamped sound-silence boundaries (accuracy +/- 16 to 32 ms) and prosody 
information in the form of F0 (with update frequency of 6 Hz; approximate accuracy of 
40 ms). This data is the input to S1, streamed to S1 in real-time.  
The task assigned to the two humans in E1 is for the interviewer to ask the 
interviewee to pick up and move things around on the table – a kind of put-that-there 
scenario (cf. Roy 2005, Bolt 1980). In E1 we provide S1 with top-level goals, 
contained in the system's "seed" (see section 6.2.1). The seed for S1 in E1 includes 
five geometrical entities: cube and sphere of two colors – and a small related set of 
categories of sensory data, as described in section 6.2.1. In E1 the speech consists of 
fairly simple utterances which are used to get the interviewee to move the objects 
around (e.g. "Take the [cube | sphere], and put it here"; "Put [a | the] [cube | sphere] 
there."); no speech is produced by the interviewee in E1. Also, three gestures were 
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allowed: grasping/releasing an object, and pointing at a position on the table. 
The task assigned to the two humans in E2 is for the interviewer to make the 
interviewee talk about some properties of objects on the table. The seed for S1 in E2 
is also defined as top-level goals, but with more complex natural language, more 
gestures and more requirements and constraints than in E1. 
6.2 Experiment 1 
 Experimental Goals & Hypotheses 6.2.1
The goal of E1 was to provide a multi-dimensional task to be learned by S1 through 
observation, while keeping the complexity of each mode (speech, gesture, semantics) 
to a defined subset of the complexity targeted in Experiment 2. The data recording 
setup for E1 was as described in section 6.1 above, with the two humans providing 
several minutes of interaction to allow S1 to learn how to do it. The objects that the 
interaction revolves around are: two blue cubes, one red cube, one red sphere, one 
blue sphere. The seed for S1 in E1 is described in detail in Nivel & Thórisson (2013); 
in short, it consists of a set of primitive commands (move hand, grab, release, point 
at) and a set of dimensions for the input space (object type, color, actor’s role, 
speech). The seed also includes initial knowledge that models the consequences of 
invoking the primitive commands: these models are for example explaining how the 
position of the system’s hand is affected by invoking the command move hand and 
how a hand and an object are linked together after invoking the command grab. The 
natural language used in E1 consisted of a fixed set of sentence fragments (see Table 
1). 
Words Word Order 
verbs: put, take 
nouns: sphere, cube 
adjectives: blue, red 
adverb: there 
determiners: a, the 
pronoun: it 
conjunctions: and, ... 
interjection (ack): thank 
you 
Utterance: (Part1), Part2 
Part1: take, [a | the] noun], (conj) 
Part1: take, [it | [a | the] noun], (conj) 
Part2: put, [it | [a | the] [blue | red] noun], there, ..., thank 
you 
Table 1 - Grammar 
The words and word order used in Experiment 1. Note that a sentence 
starting with "Take it ..." is not allowed as a first sentence in an 
interaction, as the use of ellipsis must have a prior referent. (Silence of 
some measurable length is indicated as "..."; parenthesis means 
optional.) 
Human participants in all scenarios observed by S1 are two of the system's 
developers, who interacted with each other according to the set of targeted behaviors 
(see Table 2 - What S1 should learn from observation in E1 Table 7 - High-level 
summary of the target tasks to be learned by S1 in E2). The sequence of actions and 
the use of multimodal deictics was free-form, and the interaction was real-time. The 
human participants tried to not make mistakes, but occasional errors were 
unavoidable as all sessions were live and non-scripted.  
In E1 we hypothesized that S1 could learn at least some of the behavior patterns 
needed for conducting the interaction presented in the human-human scenario of E1. 
S1 was set up to observe the humans for as long as was required for it to predict 
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accurately all major event types observed in the human-human dialogue. After this 
observation period S1 interacted with a human for a sufficiently long period to produce 
videos that could be analyzed using the t-pattern approach. 
 
Category What is to be Learned Expected Behavioral 
Characteristics  
 
Interview 
gross 
structure  
This involves essentially the system 
learning a role, driven by the top-level 
goals needed to act in either one, to the 
point where it can assume either the 
role of the interviewer or interviewee 
without problems.  
The interaction (E1) / interview (E2) 
is a sequence of requests (by 
interviewer) and responses to those 
(by interviewee). This pattern should 
emerge quite clearly.  
 
Turn-taking 
As the system is not intended to learn 
(complex) language, we look at turn-
taking that can be generated, measured, 
and evaluated without looking at the 
content (words) of the dialogue.  
Efficient turns: Small speech overlaps 
and short or no silences between 
turns.  
 
Explicit 
manual 
deictics 
Successful resolution of a manual 
deictic (pointing gesture) by the 
interviewer allows interviewee to place 
objects in the right location, and to pick 
out a referenced object out of the five. 
Pointing to objects and places on the 
table disambiguates speech by 
providing spatial information. 
 
Ellipsis 
The use of pronoun "it" and "the X" (e.g. 
"Take the cube" in the beginning of a 
new instruction) is used to reference an 
object mentioned earlier.  
Correct combination of dialogue 
events to allows correct uses of 
pronoun and adverb, supporting 
disambiguation/indication of what 
should be done.  
Table 2 - What S1 should learn from observation in E1 
 Results of Experiment 1 (E1) 6.2.2
In E1 S1 only needed to observe the humans for a few minutes until its performance 
was error-free in both roles. Videos of S1 in both roles were then recorded, of 
comparable duration, for subsequent t-pattern analysis. Results show that the 
performance of S1 matches the human-human scenario very closely. S1 is able to 
proceed as the humans in this interaction scenario, without making mistakes, in either 
role. The main high-level results of experiment 1 are summarized in Table 3. At the 
lower level of implementation, the level of models, S1 learned that state transitions 
(like moving a hand) can be achieved by asking the interviewee to perform actions 
instead of performing these itself, as a new addition to its prior knowledge encoded in 
its seed. S1 also learned that, to enact the transition of an object’s state from one 
location to another, one way is to grab said object first, then apply the same state 
transition to the hand that holds it – this was achieved by modeling pre- and post-
conditions on the model describing the state transition. S1 also learned the 
sequences of orders (“take a blue cube” then “put it there”) to fulfill the imposed drive; 
it also learned to satisfy this drive twice in a row with different targets (a blue cube 
first, then a red sphere), as demonstrated by the human actors – this results from the 
hierarchization of control via model affordances. S1 identified the correlation between 
deictics and utterances (e.g. “there” correlated with pointing gestures) – this is an 
example of learned structural hierarchy (in the form of composite states) -, as well as 
ellipsis (“put it there”). The pronoun “it” has been learned to identify the object that 
draws the most attention (in terms of job priority), i.e. the target of the most valuable 
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goals (picking an object is a learned pre-condition on the next step, moving it to some 
location, to earn the reward) – this is an example of value-driven resource allocation 
steering cognition and vice-versa. 
 
 Category What Has Been Learned Result 
Interview 
gross 
structure  
S1 has successfully learned both roles of 
interviewer and interviewee from observation, 
using only the top-level goals needed to act in 
either one. S1 has learned how to structure 
dialogue in an interview, as observed in the 
human-human interaction.  
S1 can conduct dialogue 
with a human efficiently 
and effectively, in a way 
that is virtually identical 
to human-human 
interaction. 
 
Turn-taking 
S1 has learned the basic skills of turn-taking form 
observation, as evidenced by the clearly 
demarcated turn-taking patterns.  
S1 efficiently and 
effectively takes turns, 
asking questions at the 
right times (as 
interviewer) and 
answering at the right 
times (as interviewee).  
 
Explicit 
manual 
deictics 
 
S1 has learned to use some deictics effectively by 
observation, indicating a referent by pointing 
when saying "there".  
Both the timing and form 
of the gestures is 
appropriate for the 
context. Resolution of a 
manual deictic (pointing 
gesture) by the 
interviewer allows 
interviewee to place 
objects in the right 
location, and to pick out a 
referenced object out of 
the five. 
 
Ellipsis 
S1 has learned to use ellipsis in sentence 
interpretation and generation.  
The use of pronoun "it" 
and "the X" (e.g. "Take 
the cube" in the 
beginning of a new 
instruction) is used to 
reference (as interviewer) 
/ interpreted (as 
interviewee) correctly as 
an object mentioned 
earlier.  
 
Understand / 
instruct 
correctly 
As interviewee S1 is able to pair the correct 
actions with the multimodal speech and gesture 
acts generated by the interviewer.  
Appropriate and correct 
actions taken, given the 
behavior of interviewer / 
interviewee.  
Table 3 - Summary of results obtained in Experiment 1 (E1) 
The conclusions are based on videos of the interaction between S1 and a 
human, in both roles, and on the statistical t-pattern analysis presented in this 
section.  
In E1 the high-level results of t-pattern analysis of S1's behavior can be summarized 
as follows:  
- A high number of complex turn-taking temporal patterns were detected in the 
individual data sets analyzed, comparable between all conditions (human-
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human, agent as interviewer, agent as interviewee).    
- The number, frequency, and complexity of detected patterns indicate that 
behavior was highly synchronized in all situations.  
- This synchrony was found to exist on all levels of temporality, with highly 
complex time structures that extended over considerable time spans, where 
some of the patterns repeated in a cyclical fashion.  
When looking at simple and short turn-taking patterns, similar structures are detected 
across all dyads in the S1 dialogue sessions (S1 as interviewer + S1 as interviewee). 
More complex patterns are detected in the human-human dyads than in the S1 
interaction, as S1's induction process produced abstracted models of the human 
behavior that were simpler than the observed human behavior, yet achieved the same 
goals (getting the interlocutor to behave appropriately in the context of the interaction, 
based on its stated goals).  
A thorough inspection of the videos of S1 revealed no errors in the interaction on 
behalf of S1; the system had acquired and generalized the observed human-human 
behaviors to a sufficient level to allow it to perform error-free communication in 
subsequent real-time interaction with a human, under the same operating constraints 
as in the human-human scenario.  
 
Observation Time # Turns  Observed # Errors After Observation Period 
~2.5 mins ~17 0 
Table 4 – Basic statistics in E1 
In E1 S1 only has to observe the human interaction for about 2.5 minutes 
before it is able to predict accurately their behavior, and subsequently 
assume either role without making any errors. 
 
Detected Pattern Description Significance  
h2_drop, h1_ack Interviewee drops an object on the table, 
interviewer acknowledges with a "thank you".  
p < 0.005 
h1_instr, h1_point Interviewer gives an instruction and indicates a 
location deictically (by pointing with hand/finger).  
p < 0.005 
h1_pickup, h1_drop, 
h2_ack 
Interviewee grasps an object and releases it, 
interviewer acknowledges. 
p < 0.05 
h1_instr, h1_point, 
h2_pickup, h2_drop, 
h2_partner 
Interviewer gives interviewee an instruction and 
points out a location deictically, interviewee 
grasps an object and releases it and looks at 
interviewer (head facing interviewer's location). 
 
p < 0.05 
h1_instr, h1_point, 
h2_pickup, h2_drop, 
h1_ack, h1_instr, 
h2_pickup, h2_drop, 
h1_ack 
Interviewer gives an instruction and indicates a 
location deictically, interviewee grasps an object 
and releases it, interviewer acknowledges and 
gives another instruction, interviewee grasps an 
object and releases it, interviewer acknowledges. 
 
p < 0.05 
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Table 5 - Frequent patterns in all conditions 
Some temporal behavior patterns seen in the data analyzed from 
Experiment 1 (t-pattern analysis). These relatively frequent patterns were 
statistically significant (p<0.0005), consisting of events (see Table 6 for 
legend) that occurred frequently in the same sequence with significantly 
similar timings in all conditions (human-human, S1-as-interviewer and 
human-interviewing-S1).  
 
 Hq human, interviewer role  Ha human, interviewee role 
 S1q S1, interviewer role  S1a S1, interviewee role 
 h_table head oriented towards table  h_partner head oriented towards other 
participant  
 partner trunk turned towards other 
participant 
 point hand points at object 
 pickup hand grasps object  put hand releases object  
 ask a question is asked  reply an answer is produced 
 feedb back-channel feedback is 
produced 
 inf a type of information utterance 
or action is produced 
 instr  participant gives instruction to 
other 
 ack a reply from other is 
acknowledged (by uttering 
"thank you" or by a head nod) 
Table 6 – Legend 
In the interaction the only back-channel feedback produced was a head 
nod by the interviewer indicating that the interviewee should continue 
answering. 
In our previous results from an analysis of human-agent interaction with the Gandalf 
agent (Jonsson & Thórisson 2010, Thórisson 1996, 1999) the patterns seemed to be 
somewhat slower on average than in natural human-human interaction, which can 
likely be explained by a longer average duration between critical elements of the turn-
taking system, especially the speech recognition. Compared to Gandalf, the 
pace/tempo of S1's dialogue sessions is much closer to the speed of human-human 
dyadic interaction, especially in dyadic interaction between subjects who know each 
other well (e.g. friends). A closer comparison between S1 and other human-human 
data further suggests that the turn-taking reaches a “mean level” patterning quickly, as 
is the case in dyadic interaction between friends (Jonsson 2006).  
These positive results allowed us to step up the complexity of the task significantly, 
including more complex speech and interaction, as explained in the next section. 
6.3 Experiment 2 (E2) 
 Experimental Goals & Hypotheses 6.3.1
Given the success of E1, the goal of E2 was to provide S1 with an appropriate 
increase in complexity of the task. We defined a scenario that included all behavior 
included in E1, but with considerably increased complexity in both spatial and 
language behavior. The input dimensions were encoded as before, with more objects: 
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aluminum can, glass bottle, plastic bottle, cardboard box, newspaper and painted 
wooden cube. The vocabulary was 100 words with substantially more variety in 
sentence structures. In E2 S1 was given no grammar. The task of the participants in 
E2 is to talk about these objects on the desk in front of them, in particular, the 
interviewer's task is to ask the interviewee about the materials which the various 
objects are made of, and the pros, cons, cost, and methods for recycling them. As 
before, one participant acts as interviewer, the other as interviewee.  
The data flow setup for E1 was as described in section 6.2.1 above, as is the seed 
(see also Nivel & Thórisson (2013)). In addition to models included in the seed for E1, 
the seed for E2 consist of models rewarding the interviewer for having the interviewee 
speak, and models rewarding the interviewee for speaking. 
As in E1, in E2 human participants in all scenarios were not trained actors. They 
interacted according to the targeted set of behaviors (see Table 7 and Table 8). The 
sequence of their actions and the use of multimodal deictics was free-form and real-
time, the interaction thus semi-improvised. The human participants tried to not make 
mistakes, but occasional errors were unavoidable as all sessions were live and non-
scripted. No formal grammar definition was created for the speech in E2, and neither 
this, nor a list of permissible sentences, were provided to S1 by the designers before 
S1's observation sessions started. Due to the number of commission errors in the 
speech recognizer its output was restricted to the set of 100 permissible words (see 
Table 8). 
We hypothesized that S1 could learn the behavioral patterns learned in E1, and in 
addition would learn a sufficient amount of new behaviors that were introduced in E2, 
to the extent that it could conduct at least some of the more complex interaction 
behaviors required in E2, in either role of interviewer or interviewee.  
We had S1 observe the humans until it accurately predicted all major event types 
observed in the dialogue. We then had S1 interact with the humans for a sufficiently 
long period to produce videos that could be analyzed with the t-pattern approach; 
recordings of S1 interacting in either role with one of the humans (same as who 
participated in the human-human scenario) were tens of minutes each. This formed 
the basis for subsequent data analysis.  
 
Dialog 
Pattern  
 
Details 
Expected Behavioral 
Characteristics  
Interview: 
interleaved 
questions 
and answers 
In E1 S1 had successfully learned 
how speech and gesture is used 
together by the interviewer to get the 
interviewee to perform multimodal 
acts. Now, in E2, the interview 
includes new gestures and speech for 
both roles, resulting in a more 
complex interview structure. 
S1 should learn how to interleave 
actions and speech utterances to 
achieve the goals of the dialogue.  
Spatio-
temporal 
reference 
through 
manipulation 
Simple manipulation is often used as 
a tool for disambiguating language. 
Here the co-incidence of speech, e.g. 
use of "it" or "this" and a manipulation 
gesture (picking up / holding an 
object) can be used to identify the 
intended reference.  
Synchronization of speech and object 
manipulation such that the latter 
disambiguates the former. 
Language: 
Sentence 
construction  
Sentence structure requires an 
appropriate order of words. Table 8 
shows the sentence structures used 
by humans in E2.  
Without the use of grammar, S1 
should be able to construct 
sentences in either role of interviewer 
and interviewee, based on that 
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observed being in the human-human 
interaction.  
Language: 
Constructing 
proper 
answer to 
questions 
When the interviewer asks a question, 
not only must the gestures and 
speech be interpreted for the correct 
response, the reply constructed must 
be appropriate to the question.  
Given the numerous valid questions 
that can be asked in E2, S1 should 
reply with an appropriate and correct 
utterance.  
Table 7 - High-level summary of the target tasks to be learned by S1 in 
E2 
In E2 S1 should learn everything it was seen to learn in E1 (see Table 
2), but in E2 we add the additional hypotheses listed in this table.  
 
Which releases more greenhouse gasses when produced, [an aluminum can or a glass bottle 
| an aluminum can or a plastic bottle | a plastic bottle or a glass bottle]? 
What [else | more] can you [tell, tell me, tell us, say] about [this | that | it]? 
There are many types of plastic. 
Tell [me | us] about this [object | thing | one]  
More energy is needed to recycle a plastic bottle than a can of aluminum.  
Compared to recycled plastic, new plastic releases fifty percent more greenhouse gasses.  
More energy is needed to recycle a glass bottle than a can of aluminum.  
A glass bottle takes one million years to disintegrate completely in the sun. 
Glass is made by melting together several minerals. 
A recycled aluminum-can pollutes (only) five percent of what a new [can | one] pollutes. 
Recycling an aluminum-can costs only five percent of a new one. 
Compared to recycling, making new paper produces thirty-five percent more water pollution. 
This is a cube made from unpainted wood.  
Untreated wood is biodegradable. 
Plastic is made from petroleum.  
Table 8 - Example sentence structures used by the human participants in 
E2 
The vocabulary in E2 contained 100 words (words in parenthesis can be 
omitted), which were combined in numerous ways by the human 
participants in E2. No formal grammar definition existed or was created 
for the speech in E2, and neither this, nor a list of permissible sentences, 
were provided to S1 by the designers before S1's observation sessions 
started. 
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 Results of Experiment 2 (E2) 6.3.2
In E2 S1 learned everything that it observed in the human-human interactions which 
is necessary to conduct a similarly accurate and effective interaction.
12
 The socio-
communicative repertoire acquired autonomously by S1 after an observation period of 
approximately 20 hours, has been correctly learned, with no mistakes in its 
subsequent application, including timing of all actions (Table 10). This repertoire, 
including skills in either role (interviewer and interviewee), consists of: 
- Correct sentence construction - correct word order. 
- Effective and appropriate manual and head deictics (gesturing towards 
object being talked about at the right time, gazing towards it using head 
direction when mentioned or pointed at). 
- Appropriate response generation; answer (as interviewee) and sequence of 
questions (as interviewer). 
- Proper multimodal coordination in both interpretation and production, at 
multiple timescales (interview, utterance, and sub-utterance levels). 
- Turn-taking skills (avoiding overlaps, avoiding long pauses), and utterance 
production – presentation of content (answer/question) at appropriate times 
with regard to the other's behavior. 
- Interview skills - doing the interview from first question to last question.  
 
Category What Has Been Learned Result 
 
Interview 
gross structure  
As evidenced in the videos, the 
interview proceeds exactly as in the 
human-human condition; questions are 
sequenced appropriately by S1 and 
several are posed before the interview 
is over. S1 also learned to use 
interruption to keep the interview within 
the allowed time limits.  
S1 has acquired the socio-
communicative dialogue skills 
to conduct a real-time 
multimodal interview with a 
human in real-time, and can 
correctly follow its structure as 
demonstrated in the human-
human dialogue scenario. 
Interview: 
Interleaved 
questions and 
answers 
In E1 S1 learned how speech and 
actions are used together by the 
interviewer and interviewee, 
respectively. In E2 the interview 
includes gestures and speech for both 
roles.  
S1 has acquired the ability to 
correctly interleave questions 
and answers in light of the 
goals of the interview, in either 
role of interviewer and 
interviewee. 
 
Turn-taking 
While the turn-taking seems slightly 
slower-paced than typical human-
human interaction, the style and action 
repertoire that S1 exhibits is precisely 
that observed in the human-human 
condition. 
S1 has learned basic human 
turn-taking skills, including as is 
appropriate for efficient 
language use.  
 
 
Explicit manual 
deictics 
S1 clearly shows proper use of deictics, 
both using palm as a pointing device 
and the index finger. Head direction is 
also used as a deictic device in some 
cases.  
S1 has learned to use deictics. 
Both the timing and form of the 
gestures is appropriate for the 
context.  
Spatio-temporal 
reference 
S1 can pick up an object when talking 
about it, and refer to it in language with 
S1 has learned the meaning of 
manipulation as a deictic 
device. The timing and use of 
                                                 
12 Videos of the interaction can be found on www.humanobs.org and on youtube.com under 
CADIA's video channel CADIAvideos. 
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through 
manipulation 
the pronoun "this".  manipulation for reference is 
appropriate for the context.  
Language: 
sentence 
construction  
S1 constructs all sentences correctly – 
the sequence of words is produced 
using generalized models acquired 
autonomously from observing the 
human interaction.  
S1 can construct sentences in 
either role of interviewer and 
interviewee, based on those 
observed in the human-human 
interaction.  
Language: 
Constructing 
proper answer to 
questions 
When the interviewer asked a question, 
not only were the gestures and speech 
interpreted for the correct response, the 
reply constructed was appropriate to 
the question.  
Given the numerous valid 
questions that can be asked in 
E2, S1 should reply with an 
appropriate and correct 
utterance.  
Table 9 - Summary of the key dialogue skills learned by S1 in E2  
In E2 the observation period was 20 hours, which is dramatically higher than that 
required in E1 for an equivalent error-free performance. This is due to the complexity 
of the sentences the system had to learn in E2, which alone have dramatically greater 
combinatorics than all of the behaviors observed in E1.  
 
Observation time # turns  observed # errors after observation period 
~20 hrs ~8000 0 
Table 10 - Basic statistics in E2 
As in E1, visual inspection of the resulting videos from E2 revealed no errors on 
behalf of S1 in either role; the system has generalized the human-human scenarios it 
observed to a sufficient abstraction level so as to make no mistakes when interacting 
with a human.  
The t-pattern analysis bore out the conclusion that S1 had acquired all relevant 
behavioral skills – in fact, if it wasn't for the synthesized speech it is difficult to identify 
a difference in performance by S1 and the humans. The plots in Figure 13, Figure 14 
Figure 16 show the most frequent patterns seen in E2, asking and replying, in all 
conditions.  
The results of the t-pattern analysis mirror those obtained in E1, showing again a high 
number of complex turn-taking temporal patterns in the individual data sets analyzed; 
the number, frequency, and complexity of detected patterns indicate that behavior was 
highly synchronized in all situations, and synchrony was found to exist on all levels of 
temporality, with highly complex time structures extending over considerable time 
spans, and a number of the patterns occurring in a cyclical fashion, as would be 
expected in a structured interview.  
The most frequent pattern is, as in E1, the ask-reply sequence, which contains similar 
timings across all conditions. In Figures 15, 17 and 18, more complex patterns can be 
seen. Simple and short turn-taking patterns display similar structures across all three 
conditions. Somewhat more complex patterns are seen in the human-human 
condition than those involving S1, due to the somewhat smaller repertoire of behavior 
displayed by the agent than the humans.  
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Figure 12 - Most frequent pattern in human-human condition in E2 
Not surprisingly, the most frequent pattern occurring in the human-human 
condition is the question-answer sequence. (Timescale is in frames 
@30fps = 3.1 minutes total. For legend see Table 6.) 
 
 
Figure 13 - Most frequent pattern in S1-as-interviewer condition in E2 
Just like the human-human condition, the most frequent pattern occurring 
in the S1-as-interviewer condition is the question-answer sequence, in a 
very comparable manner. (Timescale is in frames @30fps = 3.5 minutes. 
For legend see Table 6.) 
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Figure 14 - Most frequent pattern in human-interviews-S1 condition in E2 
Just like the human-human scenario, the most frequent pattern occurring 
in the human-interviews-S1 scenario is the question-answer sequence, in 
a very comparable manner. (Timescale is in frames @30fps = 2.9 
minutes. For legend see Table 6.) 
 
 
Figure 15 - Example of common patterns seen in human-human 
condition in E2, involving question-answering, head direction, and hand 
activity 
First the interviewer asks a question, looks at the table, then looks back 
at interviewee, after which the interviewee looks at the table and begins 
to answer, then looking back at the interviewer. In text format, the tree is 
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the following: ((( h2_ask,  h2 h_table )( h2 h_partner,  h1 h_table ))( h1 
reply,  h1 h_partner )). (Timescale is in frames @30fps = 1 minute 
duration. For legend see Table 6.) 
 
Figure 16 - Example of common patterns seen in S1-as-interviewer 
condition in E2 
In text format, the tree is the following: ((( h2 h_partner, h2 at_rest ) h1 
h_table )( h1,b,h_partner ( h1,b,reply,inf  h2,b,ask,inf ))). Compare to 
human-human condition in Figure 15. (Timescale is in frames @30fps = 1 
minute. For legend see Table 6.) 
 
 
Figure 17 - Example of common patterns seen in human-interviews-S1 
condition in E2 
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In text format, the tree is the following: (( h2 h_partner, h2 at_rest )(( 
h1 reply, h1 h_partner ) h2 ask )). Compare to human-human 
condition in Figure 20. (Timescale is in frames @30fps = 3.7 minutes. 
For legend see Table 6.) 
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Figure 18 - Non-overlapping patterns found in all conditions 
This plot shows a non-overlapping hierarchical pattern found in all three 
conditions made up from 49 events (leaf nodes) occurring in the same 
order with significantly similar intervals between events. No two or more 
non-overlapping patterns were found to cover more of the total combined 
time, or 77% of the total combined time of all three conditions. The overall 
pattern and all its sub-patterns are significant at the p < 0.005 level. 
(Timescale is in frames; @30fps. For legend see Table 6.) 
As the humans participating in these experiments are not trained actors, and did not 
follow a script, other than limiting their vocabulary and action repertoire as described 
above, there is good reason to believe that the skills thus learned by S1 generalize to 
a wider audience. However, the aim of this work was not specifically to build a control 
system that can interact with people but rather to create a system with a 
demonstrated ability to learn complicated tasks – human multimodal interaction of 
course being an excellent example of a domain with great complexity and variety in 
input, and one that is highly temporal, as in fact the vast majority of all real-world 
tasks are.  
The variety in inputs demonstrated to handle goes a long way towards that goal, as 
clearly seen when we inserted a constraint on the duration of the interview. In the 
latter case, S1 observed the interviewer interrupting the interviewee towards the end 
of the interview, as the time limit was about to be reached. When S1 was put in the 
role of the interviewer, the human interviewee, on purpose, took more time than usual 
answering the first questions (a situation S1 had never seen before), and this 
triggered an interrupt from S1, as it predicted the overshooting of the interview’s 
deadline and therefore the failure of its goals. 
6.4 Summary of Results 
The results from the two experiments E1 and E2 show without doubt that the AREA-
based S1 system correctly acquired and mastered correct usage of all communication 
methods used by the human interviewer and interviewee in the human-human 
condition when conversing about the recycling of the various objects' materials. The 
complete absence of errors in S1's behaviors, after the observation periods in both 
conditions, demonstrate that very reliable models have been acquired, and that these 
form a hierarchy spanning at least two orders of magnitude in time. These models 
correctly represent the generalized relationships of a non-trivial number of entities, 
knowledge which had not been provided by the system beforehand by its designers 
and was acquired autonomously, given the bootstrap seed initially provided. 
We set out to create a system that can learn, in a goal-directed way, how to achieve 
certain end-goals through generalized, autonomously acquired models that capture 
real cause-and-effect in the observed phenomena, providing a foundation for 
acquiring complex tasks through observation and reasoning. Our choice of a human 
interview to evaluate the system was not made on the grounds that we wanted to 
produce a highly human-like virtual interviewer, but was rather made purely on the 
grounds that it happens to meet a number of the key requirements that we have set 
ourselves for this work, and thus provided us a milestone of significant complexity that 
would test our work along several dimensions.  
The tasks in E1 and E2 require S1 to learn and abstract temporal sequences of 
continuous events (utterances and multimodal behavior), as well as logical sequences 
and relationships (word sequences in sentences, meaning of words and gestures) 
between a number of observed data. These were acquired through a method of 
generalization using induction, abduction and deduction, allowing S1 to respond in 
real-time situations that differ from what it has seen before (the humans were not 
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trained actors and did not repeat exactly any of their actions in any of the scenarios). 
As all representations in AERA are domain-independent, these results are highly 
encouraging, implying that S1 and its successors can be applied to a vast number of 
tasks and environments, taking a notable step up the hierarchy illustrated in Figure 1. 
7 Discussion & Related work 
Most prior work on generality and life-long self-improvement differs considerably from 
ours in many respects, both theoretically and methodologically. Two main research 
paths in prior work can be discerned that can meaningfully be contrasted with ours. 
The first is an algorithmic approach to recursive self-improvement (cf. AIXI by Hutter 
2005 and Gödel Machines by Schmidhuber 2006), based primarily on the tools and 
methodological stance of theoretical computer science; the second is work on 
cognitive architectures (cf. Laird 2012, Franklin 2013, Wang 2011, 2006), which 
shares our aim of designing holistic, complete systems, and is closer to 
implementation. Of these, Wang's stands out for taking a strong experience-grounded 
approach that we would classify as constructivist-centric, and his is the only work that 
obviously shares our goal of transversal life-long adaptation under an assumption of 
incomplete knowledge and limited resources (Wang 2006). The literature following 
these paths, especially that on cognitive architectures, counts a vast number of 
papers, ideas, proposals, and systems, but we can only fit a few select 
representatives. Here we will look at the work already cited in the order mentioned. 
The Gödel Machine (GM) is a proposal to a general approach for imparting any 
system with recursive self-improvement and, as AIXI, remains to be implemented. 
Unlike AIXI, however, it is computable, and some research has suggested steps 
toward an actual implementation (Steunebrink & Schmidhuber 2012). However, as of 
yet, no such implementation does exist. A GM is composed of two main parts: an 
initial solver – a program that solves tasks in an environment – and a searcher – a 
program that searches for an improvement (a rewrite), proves its optimality, and 
subsequently applies it. The theory specifies the conditions under which such self-
rewrites are allowed, but leaves vast problematic areas unattended. For example, 
designing an initial solver and its utility function that are general enough to handle 
non-trivial environments and tasks remains unaddressed. Moreover, designing the 
initial proof searcher presents an even bigger obstacle: generating suitable rewrite 
candidates requires either very powerful axioms (and thus tremendous foresight from 
the programmer) or a search that is probably so expensive as to be intractable. 
Indeed, the original algorithm (Schmidhuber 2006) proposes that the searcher 
enumerate theorems through Universal Search until it sees one which happens to 
contain a positive statement about self-modification. Assuming again that the search 
could be implemented in some practical way, we would then have to prove that a 
rewrite candidate will be both beneficial (with respect to the initial utility function) and 
better than continuing the search for other rewrites. Note that the proof will have to 
show that all cumulative future rewrites remain provably beneficial with respect to the 
initial utility function, which is extremely hard indeed. The difficulty of these 
fundamental remaining issues is compounded by the fact that the GM is too abstract 
to give – and therefore to exploit - any hints about the target of rewriting, i.e. the 
system itself, the very locus of construction, measurement and, eventually, 
improvement. 
Our approach to recursive self-improvement is very different: We specify and 
constrain the system’s architecture so as to avoid the aforementioned intractable 
issues. In our approach the "utility" of an improvement is not sanctioned by 
computationally expensive search and formal proofs but is sanctioned instead by 
observing an improvement's effect(s) on the performance of the system in its 
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environment – i.e. based on the system's experience over time. The spirit of this 
approach is more in line with other work of Schmidhuber et al. (1997), although AERA 
is designed to work in real-world, real-time scenarios. In AERA, finding improvements 
is this: When a prediction fails, or a goal succeeds unexpectedly, the system models 
the newly observed causal relationships and tries them out. Compared to the 
challenge of finding rewrites in the GM, this solution is trivial in terms of both 
computational cost and implementability. Unlike the GM, our system doesn't need 
shielding against destructive rewriting. In the AER approach, a system rewrites itself 
by continually adding and removing very small parts, not by modifying itself wholesale 
in successive, one-shot, global operations. Adding is always allowed because new 
code (models) is given an initial reliability that is very likely to be lower than that of 
established code and thus will not significantly change the operation of the system 
before enough positive evidences allow so; removing is also always allowed because 
(a) the necessity of doing so has been ascertained from having experienced some 
bad resulting behavior, and (b) it leads to an immediate replacement of the faulty part 
with several better candidates. The upshot is, we don't have to find rewrites: They are 
induced from observed facts, under the intrinsic necessity of improving the reliability 
of goals and predictions.  Neither do we have to prove whether a rewrite is optimal or 
not: We know that the future will eliminate bad performers, so only the best available 
– not the best possible – will survive. Of course, such a pragmatic approach faces a 
potential pitfall: Shall the system have insufficient inputs (for example, in case the 
environment is too deceptive or adversarial), its rewrites would be useless. This is one 
reason why we have proposed a need for curiosity in our system, operationalized as 
the proactive improvement of a system's own knowledge (Steunebrink et al. 2013).  
The GM framework arguably has a wider scope than our work is intended to have, 
and could possibly (in theory, at least) be applied to any system. However, it is not the 
generality of the approach that we are interested in, but rather the generality (and 
feasibility!) of the system. Because of the vast simplifications in algorithmic 
approaches, in that they for instance do not take into account system and resource 
constraints, it can ultimately be argued – without too much effort – that existing AGI 
work starting at the purely algorithmic end addresses a rather different problem than 
we do – so much so as to hardly be comparable. 
The constraints of time and energy affect all intelligences, natural and artificial (cf. 
Thórisson 2013). Adaptation to constraints is key for survival and is one of the 
reasons why intelligent control has been deemed necessary by evolution and system 
engineers alike. Yet this fundamental property, adaptation, remains to be addressed in 
most of the work on cognitive architectures claiming biological inspiration or aiming to 
explain natural intelligence. Two frequently referenced architectures that aim for 
comprehensiveness over universality, SOAR (Laird 2012) and LIDA (Franklin et al. 
2013), provide a case in point. In SOAR only one sub-state can be considered at a 
time, operators are not applied in parallel, and time-stamps on knowledge cannot be 
reasoned upon. Other critical design limitations are e.g. truth being axiomatic, and the 
system’s operation not being considered a target for reasoning, meaning that SOAR-
based systems cannot support operational reflectivity. All these design choices 
strongly indicate that the self-management, and therefore the self-adaptation, of the 
cognitive load when facing limited available resources and knowledge was not on the 
research agenda. It is unclear how systems based on this architecture can improve 
over time in any goal-directed way – or why they even should. LIDA does not answer 
this question either, as details remain to be provided on its control strategy to explain 
how the system does actually allocate computational resources to the several types 
and instances of small code fragments, called codelets, that implement the LIDA 
cognitive cycle, knowing moreover that cognition in LIDA results from the parallel 
execution of several such cycles. Even where multi-threading is claimed to support 
the execution of the two cognitive architectures above, the available descriptions fall 
short of addressing how the allocation of threads and memory impacts the operation 
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of the system – that is, how it affects cognition – and conversely, how the system 
learns to adapt its load to the resources at its disposal – i.e. how cognition impacts the 
allocation of resources and improves it. In contrast, our approach places the inter-
dependency of cognition and adaptation at the very heart of the design of control 
systems. 
Of all prior work, Wang's non-axiomatic reasoning approach (Wang 2006) shares with 
us by far the largest set of goals and assumptions. Wang has been virtually alone in 
championing the assumption of incomplete knowledge and limited resources (AIKR, 
Wang 2011), which we have adopted. His NARS (non-axiomatic reasoning system) is 
based on NAL (non-axiomatic logic), a novel term logic designed to handle uncertainty 
and growing experience. Its nine levels of expressivity, some of which share 
fundamental traits with our own logic (for example, equivalents of our likelihood, 
experience, reliability and success rate), are described in detail in Wang (2006).  
NARS is a work in progress – an implementation already exists including NAL levels 
up to six. Even though NAL is quite developed, defining a richer set of inferences than 
we have implemented so far in AERA’s S1 (e.g. analogy making, detection of 
equivalences, similarity), it does not include representations of time at its very core – 
time is only handled at the periphery (NAL level 7), which makes it difficult to control 
real-time systems. Equations in NARS are treated as first-class citizens, encoded as 
networked independent terms. While its design is in some ways quite elegant it may 
be overly complicated for both learning and exploitation. However, compared to NARS 
AERA is limited in other ways – for example, its abstraction capabilities are less 
developed than NARS’s.  
These differences aside, and from a broader perspective, NARS’s take on cognition is 
very similar to ours. As in AERA, cognition in NARS can be considered a by-product 
of allocating resources to cognitive elementary tasks, coupling cognition and resource 
allocation in a mutual and continual feedback loop. Due to NARS's potential to be 
(fully) implemented in the coming months or years, the differences and related 
underlying principles of our respective approaches can potentially be compared 
experimentally, a much faster path than relying solely on theoretical debate. Such 
comparison would likely results in improvements to both approaches.  
Even if our respective agendas differ on their over-arching goals - NARS is intended 
to capture features of human intelligence, whereas we want to build intelligent 
controllers for machinery – our principles are compatible and our systems, to some 
extent, exhibit common properties. This indicates that perhaps an adherence to AIKR 
is at least as important as other considerations and methodological issues when 
establishing the requirements for the design of cognitive architectures. 
8 Conclusion & Future Work 
Generality and recursive self-improvement are key capabilities for systems intended 
to continually maintain their effective delivering of value to their owners, despite 
unforeseen and possibly adversarial situations. These are fundamental challenges for 
artificial general intelligence to which we, going beyond prior attempts in this direction, 
present experimental results and demonstrable solutions. 
We have demonstrated an implemented architecture that can learn autonomously 
many things in parallel, at multiple time scales. The results show that AERA system 
S1 can learn complex multi-dimensional tasks from observation, while provided only 
with a small ontology, a few drives (high-level goals), and a few initial models, from 
which it can autonomously bootstrap its own development. This is initial evidence that 
our CAIM methodology, based on the principles of AER, is a way for escaping the 
constraints of current computer science and engineering methodologies. Human dia-
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logue is an excellent example of the kinds of complex tasks current systems are inca-
pable of handling autonomously. The fact that no difference of any importance can be 
seen in the performance between S1 and the humans in simulated face-to-face inter-
view is an indication that the resulting architecture holds significant potential for fur-
ther advances. 
That being said, in its current incarnation AERA is entirely dependent on observation, 
as learning is exclusively triggered by unexpected goal achievement, or a prediction 
that turns out to be wrong – i.e. by surprise. This limits the acquisition of knowledge to 
phenomena that are directly observable – hidden causation is difficult for the current 
system to figure out, as are other kinds of inexplicit relations (similarity, equivalence, 
etc.). Another functionality the system lacks is some form of curiosity, as it is not able 
to produce hypotheses and conduct related experiments to eventually learn proactive-
ly, for the system to be intrinsically motivated to fill the gaps in its (inevitably limited) 
knowledge. One form of this is “motor babbling”, which we have experimented with in 
the prototype to bootstrap learning. So far this has relied on ad-hoc hand-crafted 
goals injected into the system at strategic times by the designers, and therefore this 
technique was not allowed to be used in the S1 agent presented here. The question 
of how to generate such goals in a principled way automatically is currently being in-
vestigated. In an extension of the AIKR assumption, we have argued that curiosity 
results from the need to overcome the limitations imposed by the scarcity of inputs 
(Steunebrink et al. 2013). We plan to expand the types of programs to implement a 
richer set of inferences from which curious behaviors can be devised and planned, 
whenever the system has resources to spare. Interestingly, when improving the capa-
bilities of our architecture thus far we have strictly proceeded by addition rather than 
by modification (“hacking”): We conjecture that our methods are amenable to signifi-
cant and tractable improvement, but far from claiming its theoretical universality we 
bet instead on its practical scalability, which leads us to our last and final remark.  
To support the claim of achieving bounded self-improvement in general, one has to 
demonstrate a fundamental property namely, scalability. This work is still too recent for 
making an assessment to support such a claim. One of the main directions of our 
planned near-future work is thus set toward building more prototypes to provide more 
evidence for the generality of our system and, for its scalability. This endeavor, no 
doubt, will make use of the advanced self-modeling and self-control facilities that have 
been already implemented. In particular, we will leverage the self-compilation capacity 
mentioned in section 5.3, as one of the main thrusts toward scaling up. 
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